

CURRENT History

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FEBRUARY 1966

VIETNAM AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

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CURRENT History

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In this issue, Current History focuses on Vietnam and on the problems this troubled area now presents to the United States and to the rest of the world. In the introductory geographical study, the author portrays the Vietnamese countryside, where a population of some 32 million live in an area about half the size of Texas.

Vietnam: Its Land and People

By SAMUEL VAN VALKENBURG

Visiting Professor of Geography, George Washington University

THROUGHOUT THE HISTORY of mankind, Vietnam, as well as the rest of Southeast Asia, has been a land of passage. From China, and probably also from Tibet, groups of people of different races and ethnic composition moved in a southern direction. Climatic changes in central Asia as well as Chinese expansion south of the Hoang Ho may have been responsible. Each new wave, probably stronger in the use of arms, pushed the preceding group farther south or forced the inhabitants to seek refuge in less attractive terrain such as mountains or isolated islands. Very probably, the people of the Pacific—the Melanesians, Micronesians and Polynesians—came this way. (During the Ice Age, the Asiatic landmass extended to Borneo-Bali, because of the lower level of the world's oceans, and from there island hopping by small boats was comparatively easy.)

At the time of Christ, the Vietnamese had already entered Tonkin from China. Politically, there were then in Indochina two units; the Chams on the east coast, who had established the state of Champa, and the Mon Khmer, who had their core area in present Cambodia, but extended eastward across the

Mekong delta in what was later called Cochin China (the present Saigon area). Gradually, the Vietnamese moved southward and replaced the Chams. The State of Champa ceased to exist in the fifteenth century but remnants of that group (about 35,000) can be found in small interior villages in the south-central part of the country.

The southern movement of the Vietnamese continued and gradually they encroached on the Mon Khmer territory in Cochin China and the delta. There are still between 350,000 and 400,000 Mon Khmer left in Vietnam near the Cambodian border. The mountain tribes, numbering about half a million in South Vietnam and well above a million in the north, show a complex ethnic structure. There are many separate tribes who originally came from the Tibetan Highlands and were accustomed to a mountain environment. The French called them Montagnards, which name is now used for all the mountain inhabitants.

Finally, there are the Chinese. For centuries, Vietnam was either Chinese-controlled or accepted some form of Chinese sovereignty. In more recent times, large numbers of Chi-

nese have migrated to Vietnam. Their number is especially large in the south where, to a large extent, they run Vietnamese enterprise. Cholon, twin city of Saigon, is entirely Chinese and the total number of Chinese is estimated to be around 125,000 not counting the many who have adopted Vietnamese citizenship.

POPULATION

Vietnam is not a large country: its total area of 130,000 square miles is half the size of Texas. The 17°N parallel demarcation line between the south and the north divides it into two almost equal parts. The total population is also divided almost equally: 14 million for the south and 16 million for the north. Rural densities in some of the cultivated plains are high. For the Tonkin basin, density is about 1,500 people per square mile, which is equivalent to the highest in China, India or Java. In contrast, the rural density for the Mekong delta is only 250 people per square mile, which explains, to a certain extent, why the Mekong delta is a rice surplus area while the Tonkin delta has at times a deficit.

LANGUAGE AND RELIGION

The Vietnamese have their own language, one of the large groups of tonal language that include Burmese, Thai and Chinese. There are several dialects which differ somewhat in vocabulary, pronunciation, and tonal pattern. Chinese ideographs which represent words, not letters, were used for writing. Through the influence of missionaries (Portuguese and French), this style of writing has been replaced by the Roman script. Chinese characters are now used only for ceremonial purposes. The use of foreign languages (French and English) will be discussed later. The Mon Khmers speak a different language and their script is a system of characters devised in southern India, and imported into Indochina through many cultural contacts. The Mon Khmer script has not been successfully replaced.

The Montagnards speak a variety of languages. Those in the south speak a language

related to the Mon Khmer: in the northern mountains, their languages are part of the Tibetan family of languages.

It is not easy to discuss the religions of Vietnam in a few words. Through Chinese influence, the religious atmosphere is a mixture of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism, with Christianity appearing in more recent centuries through the influence of missionaries, primarily French. But, most of the Vietnamese can be regarded as nominal Buddhists.

Buddhism in Vietnam belongs to the Mahayana branch, or the Greater Vehicle. It accepts many Buddhas or "Enlightened Ones"; it also recognizes numerous minor saints or Buddhisatras. Buddhist priests conduct services in the temples and appear at many ceremonies to offer prayers. In recent years, they have become politically minded and have been responsible for demonstrations and burnings.

Confucianism does not clash with Buddhism. It teaches a philosophy of life, especially for the family, with many obligations and duties, such as respect for elders and veneration for ancestors. Important at the time of Chinese influence when mandarins were the ruling elite, Confucianism has lost a great deal of its influence. Taoism, once a speculative philosophy, has deteriorated into a cult of magic and, like Confucianism, has lost power.

Two special sects should be mentioned, the Cao Dao and the Hoa Hao. The Cao Dao recognizes several gods of various religions. It speaks about the Third Amnesty (the first one proclaimed by Moses and Jesus, the second one by Buddha and Lao-tze). It has about two million adherents and its great cathedral is at Tag Ninh, northwest of Saigon. It has been suppressed by the Vietnam government but continues its religious influence. The Hoa Hao is a branch of Himayana Buddhism—the so-called Lesser Vehicle: its leaders have been outlawed and temporarily, at least, it has ceased to be of influence.

Christianity has grown, especially in the south since an influx of Christian refugees at the time of the separation between North and

South. They number well over a million in South Vietnam and a number of the leading figures are Catholic. The most prominent Vietnamese Christian was Ngo Dinh Diem, chief-of-state from 1955 to 1963 when he was murdered. In North Vietnam, religion is tolerated but certainly not encouraged.

THE IMPACT OF THE FRENCH

The French in their colonies always sponsored their own culture. In Vietnam, this impact became a very important factor in social life. French was taught in school and higher education (starting at the high school level) was entirely in French. In intellectual circles and even in the urban middle class, French was spoken fluently. French literature and French theater dominated the cultural scene. Western dress, especially for men, replaced the national clothing.

In spite of French defeat and anti-French political sentiment, French cultural influence continues. Many students are educated in France and there is no reason to believe that French culture will be doomed because of political changes. Since the Americans replaced the French, English has also become important, but only as a means of communication, rather than as a cultural influence: it has not replaced French and probably never will.

THE TOPOGRAPHY

Topographically speaking, Vietnam is a country of mountains. From the north (South China) and the northwest (Tibetan Plateau) a complex mountain system extends south to Cape St. Jacques, favorite resort for the Saigonese.

The French call the system *Chaîne Annamitique*, but in most parts it does not have the character of a simple mountain range. It is deeply dissected by erosion, with numerous mountain valleys leading either west to the Mekong River or east to the South China Sea. In the northern area these mountains fill all of Laos and most of North Vietnam; there the range reaches its highest elevation, about 10,000 feet. In the middle section, the mountain area narrows to about 125 miles

between the Mekong and the sea and Vietnam's share, at that point, is only 33 miles. In the south, the mountain area is much wider; it includes plateaus where lower temperatures and open scenery attracted the French and, later, the Americans as suitable resort locations. Sparsely populated, the mountains have acted through history as a barrier—political as well as economic—and as a refuge for groups of people.

Lowland more suitable for food production and human occupancy is limited to three major areas: namely, the Mekong delta, the eastern coastal plain and the Red River basin of Tonkin in the north. The Mekong delta is a huge flat area, extending west of Saigon; a region of river branches and creeks with rice fields between them. The eastern coastal plains are a sequence of longer and shorter plains separated by mountain offshoots which form promontories. Generally these plains do not extend far inland: the mountain foothills are only a short distance from the coast. The Tonkin basin is a former extension of the Gulf of Tonkin, filled by the deposits of the rivers which run into the basin; it is the most densely populated section of Vietnam.

Climate is most important for an understanding of the economy. Its tropical location—the Tropic of Cancer is just north of Vietnam—results in warm temperatures and few seasonal differences. It is only in the north that the average temperature of the coldest month drops into the lower 60's. At the same time, high temperatures—in the 90's or above—are rare. One might say it is always very warm (average in the middle 80's for the afternoon) and it rarely cools below 70 degrees at night. Of course the mountains are cooler, depending on elevation.

In a tropical country, an evaluation of the rainfall is important. How much does it rain? How is the distribution? Are there climatic dangers such as destructive storms? Vietnam is part of the East Asiatic monsoon system. In winter, continental air masses flow from out of the continental high pressure located near Lake Baikal in Siberia toward the Pacific Ocean. In the north (Korea, Japan) their direction is from the

northwest. But earth rotation deflects them and when air masses reach Vietnam they are northeasterly winds. Cold and dry near their places of origin, they warm up crossing the relatively warm ocean and pick up a certain amount of moisture.

But these air masses still have a dry character and will cause precipitation only if they are forced to rise over mountains and reach the condensation point through cooling. This happens on the east coast of Vietnam which accordingly has a fairly high amount of winter precipitation. The rest of Vietnam, especially the Mekong Delta, is dry during that time; Saigon has practically no rain for 4 months.

In summer, just the opposite happens. Air masses from the Indian Ocean move counterclockwise into the warm continent. These equatorial air masses contain a great deal of water vapor and when they reach the land, heat causes rising and cooling (convection) and heavy rain results. On the windward side of the mountain range, the rainfall is even heavier, while on the leeward side it is less. To give an example, Saigon on the plain, but on the windward side, has 13.7 inches of rain in June. Hué, on the leeward side, has 2.3 inches, and a mountain station has 30 inches. Also, the Tonkin basin gets a great deal of rain as the air mass is pulled in from the Gulf of Tonkin. Annam has accordingly two types of climate: summer rain over most of the area, and, along the east coast, less in summer and more in winter.

The east coast has a special climatic feature—typhoons—which are most frequent in fall. Hué has a combined October-November precipitation of 55 inches, which is quite a deluge. Total amounts vary according to location, but a great deal of the mountain area has more than 120 inches. Only along the southeast is there a narrow dry zone (below 40 inches) near Cape Padaran: here the seasonal air masses run parallel to the coast. In winter, there is a special weather feature in the Tonkin basin. Cold air descends the mountain slopes and forms a layer of fog which hangs over the basin. On the ground drizzle gives enough moisture to permit the

continuation of crop production while the fog layers hide the country from the eyes of planes.

FLORA AND FAUNA

Differences in vegetation follow the rainfall pattern but are locally influenced by soil condition. In areas of heavy rain, an equatorial type of rainforest covers the mountain slopes and makes traffic most difficult. Where there is seasonal precipitation and a fairly long dry season, jungle replaces the rainforest and the landscape is more open, although still difficult to cross. Some of the high plateaus have a grass vegetation with conifers. In the lowlands, man has eliminated the forests and replaced them with an intricate system of cropfields, as well as a profusion of fruit trees. Clusters of these trees seen from the air can be associated with the position of settlements.

The forests, especially during the wet season, contain the usual tropical creeping and flying animals and insects, which can make life most unpleasant. Large animals are rarely seen, although Vietnam has the reputation of being a good area for hunting elephants, tigers, leopards and wild oxen. Monkeys are seen everywhere. Crocodiles are found in the Mekong delta.

LAND USE

The approximately 32 million inhabitants of Vietnam have to live on what the land produces. There may be an exchange of surpluses between localities but Annam was never rich enough to import large quantities of food (except for the relatively small number of whites and Chinese with their more expensive food habits). Rice is the major food crop. Carefully laid out ricefields cover most of the lowland area. In the rainy summers, only the narrow dikes between the fields stand higher than the water in which the riceplants grow. When the rainy season is long enough, two crops of rice can be harvested and, in some plains along the east coast, rice cultivation is practically continuous. Yields are low: even somewhat below the average of southeast Asia and quite low

if compared with those of Japan or the United States. All of the work is done by man, who plants the young sprouts which have been grown in small plots, protects them while they mature and harvests them when the time comes.

North Vietnam has a veritable ricebowl in the Tonkin basin. Embankments protect the fields against the danger of frequent river floods. Life is at stake; if the harvest fails, famine will result. There is no surplus; the concentrated mass of population (one of the highest densities in the world) needs all the food it can raise.

The situation in the second major rice area, the Mekong delta, is quite different. Flood danger is much less here because the Mekong river has natural reservoirs which contain any excess water when the river level is high. Famous as a reservoir is the Tonle Sap, a lake located in Cambodia which has a river connection with the Mekong. The lake was once an arm of the ocean, later cut off by Mekong river deposits. In winter, when the level of the Mekong is low, water flows from the lake into the Mekong. The lake is then a shallow body of water with an area of about 1,000 square miles. At the time it is excellent fishing ground, a good source of food for the Cambodians. When the water rises in the Mekong, in summer and early fall, its level is above that of the lake and the river reverses its course. The latter then extends to an area of 4,000 square miles. The Tonle Sap thus acts as a safety valve for the Mekong, probably explaining the low flood risk in the Mekong delta, which needs no embanking against flood.

Rice cultivation in the Mekong delta is fairly recent. Man originally avoided the delta swamps, and some parts are still unused. For this area the French used the name *Isle des Oiseau*, the island of the birds.

The Mekong delta was, with the Irrawaddi and the Menam, one of the rice surplus areas of southeast Asia. It still exports some rice, but war and the increase of population have diminished the surplus. On the mountain slopes, dry rice fields are based on precipitation alone: yields are generally low. There

are of course other crops, such as sweet potatoes, sugar cane and numerous tropical fruits.

Estate (plantation) type of agriculture is almost entirely limited to rubber, although there is some tea and coffee. The center of rubber production is north of Saigon, and is still run by the French, partly for the Michelin factory in Clermont Ferrand in France. The author well remembers a trip to one of the estates of this area (*Société des Terres Rouges*) which certainly gave the impression of being a well-run concern. Interestingly, economic assets have been protected by both sides even in time of war.

MINERALS

It has been a custom to say about an area of which little was known that it is rich in minerals. In the case of Vietnam, the statement has also been made, but as far as South Vietnam is concerned there is little to support this. North Vietnam is better off. Near Haiphong there are coal (anthracite) deposits, unique in this part of the world. Production is about 3.2 million tons. Moreover, there are phosphates, tin and chromites, but none of outstanding importance.

INDUSTRIES

Industrial development is still in its infancy. When the conflict between North and South began the North was better off. But even that "better" was not much. Since then, both countries have increased their industrial capabilities. In North Vietnam, various Communist nations have provided the means for new industries, but the variety of plants does not go beyond the immediate needs of the home market: textiles, cement, rubber, plastic and engineering works. Industrial help for South Vietnam came from our side of the Iron Curtain and is of the same variety. Hanoi, the capital, and Haiphong, the harbor, are the manufacturing towns in the North. In the South, Saigon is the chief manufacturing center.

TRANSPORTATION

Transportation facilities were inherited

from the French, who constructed roads as well as railroads. The main railroad line ran from Saigon along the coast bypassing the promontory to Hanoi where it connected in peacetime with the Chinese system, one line going to Kuming in Yunnan and the other to Canton. This coastal line has been frequently interrupted by the Vietcong and it stops before reaching the South-North demarcation line. It has some feeder lines; the most important is the one to Dalat, the mountain resort. In Tonkin, the capital, Hanoi, and the harbor, Haiphong, are connected by rail.

The roads system, which goes back to the French period, had been disturbed when French Indochina was divided into individual nations: the road net had been Indochinese, not Cambodian, Laotian or Vietnamese. The main road follows the coast from Saigon to Hanoi, connecting the coastal towns. A second trunk from south to north goes through the mountain country but parts of it are on Vietcong controlled territory. Two roads cross the mountains from the coast to the Mekong. The shortest crossing is the former French Route National 9, which runs south of the demarcation line between North and South Vietnam.

However, at present, practically all roads have only occasional value. Frequent Vietcong roadblocks obstruct traffic even on the road between Saigon and its beach resorts, while bridges are often destroyed. On the side of North Vietnam, frequent, almost daily, air attack by American planes have done substantial damage to road installations and bridges. The famous Vietcong road is only a trail through the mountains which at times makes detours into the Communist-occupied part of Laos to avoid areas now under Vietnam and American control. Economically, all roads have lost their value: only convoys can travel them.

River traffic is limited to the Mekong delta and some parts of the Tonkin basin and only small boats can be used. Saigon and Haiphong are modern ports for ocean-going vessels; the other harbors are generally open roadsteads where tenders have to be used,

The somewhat eccentric position of Saigon and the limited docking space result in a serious bottleneck, especially because during the war period, road and rail connections inland are uncertain, to say the least. At present, ships often have to wait at the entrance (Cape St. Jacques) for weeks until harbor space is available. A great deal of the freight has to be transferred to smaller vessels which can use the coastal harbors to the north. Special mention should be made of Camranh Bay, one of the world's best natural harbors, located on the southeast coast. Lacking a productive hinterland, it remained undeveloped until the Americans recently established a major landing place there.

CITIES

Annam under ancient rule was not a country of large cities. The French developed Saigon and Hanoi as capitals and centers of administration, commerce and education. Both cities accordingly have a French character. Saigon, with its *Place d'Opéra*, its boulevards and cafés, is a pocket edition of Paris, as far as the city center is concerned. With its Chinese twin city of Cholon, in colonial times it was already a large city. The influx of refugees rapidly increased its number of inhabitants: in 1959 its population was given as 1.6 million: it is now probably well above the 2 million mark. Hanoi also increased in population; in 1960, the population was 650,000. Communist control and the lack of Western culture, so typical of Saigon, give Hanoi a drab appearance.

(Continued on page 115)

Samuel Van Valkenburg is director of the graduate school of geography at Clark University, where he has been on the faculty since 1927. Born in the Netherlands, Professor Van Valkenburg studied in the Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland, and served in the Netherlands East Indies with the Royal Topographical Service before joining the Clark faculty.



† Siam is now called Thailand.

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INDOCHINA

In this informative article, a well-known specialist, tracing the history of French colonial rule, points out that "the several score decades of French rule in Vietnam meant much to the economic development of the country, but they made relatively little contribution to the solution of the eventual postwar problems of unification and self-government."

The French Colonial Regime in Vietnam

By JOHN F. CADY

Professor of History, Ohio University

THE INITIAL ESTABLISHMENT of French rule in Vietnam dates from mid-point in the reign of Emperor Louis Napoleon III in the late 1850's. Opportunity for the French move into Vietnam was afforded by French participation—at Britain's invitation—in the Second Anglo-Chinese War of 1858-1860 (as a continuation of Anglo-French collaboration during the preceding Crimean War). The primary objective of the war was to open China more widely to Western trade and to establish direct diplomatic representation with Peking. The French forces which were transported to eastern Asia under cover of the European war with China were also available for operations to establish a French base in Vietnam. The project was intended to strengthen the influence of France in the Orient and to bolster the prestige of the fledgling Napoleonic dynasty with the idea that the French empire which had been liquidated in India in 1763 would again emerge in eastern Asia.

The tradition of French political and military involvement in Vietnam—as opposed to actual control—dated from the late eighteenth century. A French vicar apostolic of the Paris Foreign Mission Society named Pigneau de Behaine sponsored, during the 1780's and 1790's, the mobilization of several hundred French-led adventurers to support the candidacy of an exiled prince of the Nguyen line, who then succeeded to the throne as

Emperor Gia Long in 1802. French influence at the court of Hué (the seat of imperial authority, on the coast in central Vietnam) persisted for two decades thereafter in the persons of two high-ranking European mandarins. Following the death of Gia Long in 1820, the French lost favor—due in part to court jealousies and in part to suspicions aroused by the over-persistent efforts of French emissaries to establish regular consular and diplomatic relations.

A final break between King Minh Mang (the successor to Gia Long) and the French came in 1830, even though a substantial number of Catholic missionaries continued resident in the country. Although these missionaries were by no means exclusively French, all of them reflected the religious enthusiasm which characterized the ultramontane spirit of the post-Napoleonic church. King Minh Mang inaugurated outright persecution of the missionaries in 1833, when Christian elements of the population were suspected of being involved in a rebellion. Thereafter, all missionaries were required to maintain their residences at Hué. During the ensuing seven year period, the king executed at least ten Europeans on a variety of political charges, a development which gave rise to anguished cries in Paris for some measure of protection.

An opportunity for accommodation was afforded in 1840, when King Minh Mang despatched a diplomatic mission to Paris seeking

an understanding. However, the government of King Louis Philippe refused under clerical pressure to give royal audience to the Vietnamese peace mission, while at the same time he accepted no responsibility for protecting over-venturesome Catholic missionaries in Vietnam. Throughout the 1840's, French naval vessels cruising in east Asian waters made periodic, if unauthorized, visits to Vietnamese ports to protest Hué's ill-treatment of European missionaries. Five of the latter were rescued in 1842; others were taken out in 1845 and 1847. Several of them then resolutely reentered the country in clandestine fashion; meanwhile, agitation mounted within French naval and ecclesiastical circles for more effective measures to insure missionary safety.

INITIAL FRENCH INTERVENTION

Events in Europe intervened to delay the French action in Indochina for a full decade. However, the issue of Vietnam could not be indefinitely postponed because Napoleon III was vulnerable to clerical pressure. He was greatly concerned to prevent any political alignment of the French church with the Legitimist Bourbon opposition of the Right—the same concern which had prompted his garrisoning of Rome in 1849, his consignment of educational control to the clergy, and his championing of the Catholic cause in the Holy Land. In addition, accession to clerical demands for protection of missionaries in Vietnam would afford him a means to enhance the prestige of France in the Orient. Another supporting consideration was the apparent need to redress an impairment of French prestige resulting from a bungled French diplomatic-naval demonstration near Hué in late 1856 intended to force the then leader, King Tu Duc, to negotiate on French terms.

Louis Napoleon's decision in 1857 to use French participation in the China war as an instrument for planting the French flag in the Orient was hastily made. It lacked the positive concurrence of the French foreign office and was not based on a realistic assessment of the difficulties involved. In the absence of

any other tangible French interest to serve in eastern Asia, France undertook the role of protector of Catholic missionaries of whatever nationality, although—at the last moment—the Spanish authorities at Manila were invited to cooperate in the Vietnamese venture in order to give it an aura of international and humanitarian concern.

The Franco-Spanish attack was eventually launched at Tourane harbor (modern Da-nang) in the autumn of 1858, following the completion of the first phase of the China war. It discouragingly ran aground due to a number of factors—faulty intelligence supplied by clerical agents, difficulties of terrain, heat and rainfall, impure water supply, intestinal disorders, and malaria. In order to salvage something from the languishing effort, the French attack was shifted in early 1859 to Saigon, where a tenuous foothold was established. Here a tiny French-Filipino garrison held out for some two years before any substantial relief was available. (The second phase of the China war intervened calling for a major allied effort to capture Peking, and Louis Napoleon, also, had been blackmailed into an ill-starred intervention in Italy.)

When relief forces from the China theater finally reached Saigon in the spring of 1861, it became possible to improve the immediate situation and to take stock of the entire undertaking. French naval officers left in charge at Saigon were able, by reason of the outbreak of a partisan rebellion in Tonkin (sometimes Tonking) in 1862–1863, to obtain Hué's acceptance and ratification of initial treaty terms conceding French control over the environs of Saigon and commercial access to additional ports. Further *de facto* French gains were realized a year later in neighboring Cambodia, where Saigon under the French reassumed Vietnam's traditional role of suzerain and challenged the competing claims of Siam. Hué eventually, in 1867, recognized French hegemony over Cambodia at Phnom Penh.

RULE OF THE ADMIRALS

French administration of Cochinchina (the most southern Vietnamese district) proved bafflingly difficult. The naval officers

in control at Saigon were entirely unfamiliar with the local languages and customs, and the indigenous mandarin officials were unable to exercise effective control when divorced from the traditional authority of the Court of Hué. Another handicap was the estrangement which developed between the naval personnel and the Catholic missionary community arising from the intelligence failure during the 1858 attack and the subsequent inability of Saigon to afford protection for the exposed Christian community of northern Vietnam.

Back in Paris, Napoleon III completely lost interest in the dismal enterprise in Indochina. In 1864, he gave tentative approval to an agreement negotiated by a representative of Hué which would have reduced the status of French claims outside of Saigon proper to nominal protectorate level. Only the strenuous protests of the French admiralty forced a reversal of his decision and a repudiation of the agreement. Meanwhile, he had also become involved (again by clerical instigation) in the ill-fated Mexican adventure with Austria's Prince Maximilian and, after 1865, he was obliged to give his primary attention to the growing threat to France posed by the rise of Prussian power under Bismarck.

Despite the absence of official support from Paris, French naval officers at Saigon managed to stage two advance moves in 1867–1868. The first was their unilateral assertion of control over the additional provinces of Cochinchina, a claim which Hué long refused to recognize. The other move was to dispatch the Lagrée-Garnier expedition up the Mekong Valley—a move sponsored jointly by Saigon and the Paris Geographical Society. The expedition's principal discovery was that the Mekong River was unusable for commercial purposes and that—alternatively—southwestern China could best be approached by the Red River Valley of Tonkin.

This latter route was utilized commercially in 1873–1874 by a French merchant adventurer, Jean Dupuis, acting in cooperation with the Chinese governor of Yunnan and in collusion with French naval officers at Saigon. French representatives sent from Saigon to Hanoi (in the district of Tonkin) to obtain

the release of the captured Dupuis attempted in vain to seize and hold the citadel. The *coup* collapsed, but the Governor at Saigon managed in 1875 to obtain, as the price of French withdrawal from Hanoi, Hué's ratification of the 1867 claims to all of Cochinchina.

Following the defeat of France at the hands of Bismarck's Prussian forces in 1870–1871, Paris authorities became less interested than ever in the Cochinchina enterprise. French peace negotiators actually offered in 1871 to cede to the emerging German state all French holdings in Indochina, in a futile effort to reduce Bismarck's territorial demands in Europe. The Prussian leader declined the offer on the ground that Germany lacked the resources to develop the Cochinchina holding. Further, the Duc de Broglie, who headed the French foreign office at the time, was a convinced anti-imperialist. Pending the resolution of the feud between French republicans and monarchists (to 1879), no advance move was attempted in Vietnam. The marine department almost singlehandedly maintained the French commitment at Saigon.

REVIVAL OF FRENCH IMPERIALISM

The eventual extension of French control to include the Annamite littoral (of which Hué was the center) and the northern provinces of Tonkin was accomplished between 1882 and 1885, during the incumbency of Jules Ferry as French premier. He undertook to promote colonial expansion by enlisting patriotic and business support, as a means of diverting attention from domestic political quarrels. He was far more successful in Vietnam than in France. This stepped-up program entailed two military clashes with China, which had been invited by Hué after 1877 to revive its long suspended suzerain role over Vietnam, in an effort to counter the French threat. One clash occurred along the Tonkin-China border; the second was a naval encounter off the China coast. In the end, the palsied Peking government was obliged, in 1885, to concede French protectorate claims to all of Vietnam and to permit commercial access up the Red River Valley.

The unpopularity of Ferry's venturesome policy contributed to his resignation as premier, and the Chamber of Deputies barely approved his treaty with China. For more than a decade thereafter, majority French opinion concerning the Indochina involvement continued to be sharply negative. Critics in the 1890's complained bitterly that France had little to show for an expenditure, since 1861, of some 750 million francs, which included perennial treasury contributions to cover the annual deficits of the colony. And this bitterness was compounded by the French espousal, in 1893, of a protectorate role in Laos, which then resulted in a brief war with Siam.

CIVILIAN RULE AND DEVELOPMENT

The fashioning of an integrated and progressive administrative system for all of Indochina to replace the improvisations of the long succession of naval Residents-General was demanded not only by the complaints of French taxpayers but also by the exigencies of the local situation. The decision to shift the responsibility for the administration of Indochina to a separated ministry of colonies was made in 1887 but not implemented until 1894. French Commissioner J. P. de Lanessan accomplished the modulation of his office to that of Governor-General during his four-year term from 1891 to 1895.

At the time chronic rebellion prevailed in Tonkin, coastal pirates were playing havoc with shipping and the local administration skirted collapse. However, under de Lanessan, order was restored, tax revenues were doubled and capital loans were negotiated for the construction of port facilities, railways and roads. The task was continued by Governor Paul Doumer (1897-1902), who improved administrative effectiveness and solved the problem of economic stagnation. He devised for the five disparate units of Indochina an integrated system of colonial administration. In Cochinchina, where traditional mandarin rule had long disappeared, French officials ruled directly under a modified system of French law and an advisory Colonial Council. In Annam and Tonkin, Doumer

made use of the traditional authority of the Court of Hué and the mandarinat under supervision of French *Residents Supérieur* and with ultimate financial control vested with the French in Saigon. The royal governments of Cambodia and Laos were maintained in operation with minimal French interference.

The crux of the Doumer system centered on the allocation of financial responsibility. Each of the five units developed its own budget and revenues, drawn mainly from land and poll taxes. The general customs revenues and excise duties on such items as rice, liquor, matches and opium went into the central treasury. Administration of the judiciary and of civil affairs was generally supervised from the center, which also authorized and financed the construction of public works, communication facilities, agricultural and mining ventures.

Except in Cochinchina, where French economic investments were heavily concentrated, the traditional systems of local administrative routine remained quite operative. A special role was reserved for provincial chambers of agriculture and of commerce in the consideration and approval of particular development projects. The chambers also acted as operating agencies for the collection of port dues, the operation of dock facilities, and the supervision of other public works. They also helped select the *Conseil Supérieur*, which reviewed all budgetary allocations, expenditures for defense and economic development, in addition to considering legislative and administrative problems.

The results were highly gratifying. During Doumer's five-year incumbency, the volume of Indochina's commerce doubled and some 1700 kilometers of railways were constructed. Another creative governorship was headed by Albert Sarraut (1911-1917). He opened the central bureaucracy to selected Vietnamese, required French officials to study local languages, extended flood control measures, and adjusted operative legal codes to local customs. The establishment by the French of an integrated but flexible system of colonial administration which was self-supporting

financially and was also engaged in extensive economic development was a testament to the imagination and the skill of its fashioners and outside visitors did not hesitate to praise the French program highly.

MERCANTILIST POLICIES

The principal defects of the French colonial system related to its rigidly mercantilist character. Cochin-China, in particular, afforded attractive employment for thousands of French civil servants and some 5,700 Europeans were so employed in 1911. Expanding markets and investment opportunities were similarly reserved for French exploitation, while Vietnamese trade with nearby Asian countries was discouraged by the imposition of discriminatory customs' dues. Little opportunity was afforded for the Vietnamese themselves to participate in any of the expanding areas of the economy, such as transportation, mining, plantation agriculture or banking, while at the same time Chinese immigrants tended to dominate local trade in the south. Traditional handicraft industries, such as pottery, basket making, cotton and silk weaving, and oil extraction steadily declined.

Nor did the Vietnamese participate significantly in the new administrative councils which were developed. The Colonial Council at Saigon, for example, included ten persons elected by the Vietnamese elite—out of a total of 24—while the reviewing Privy Council of 12 members included only two appointed local notables. Further, the mercantile policy was made doubly rigid by the influence of proliferating policy agencies within France, representing virtually every group, public or private, who could claim an interest in colonial matters.

French pride of culture and considerations of national prestige strongly reenforced mercantilist economic tendencies, serving to blind all but the most perceptive colonial officials to an appreciation of the Vietnamese point of view. Education in postwar Vietnam was French-controlled and strictly limited in both character and availability. Approximately 9 per cent of the boys and 1 per cent of the girls

were afforded opportunities for elementary education. High schools specialized mainly in vocational training, with seldom more than 800 students being accommodated in any given year. The university established at Hanoi in 1917 never exceeded an enrollment of 1,100 students. Only a very few privileged Vietnamese students ever found their way to schooling in France.

French policy strove to assimilate the educated elite into the French culture. Naturalization as Frenchmen was nevertheless reserved for selected persons within the French-speaking minority, especially those with French wives, members of the Legion of Honor, or those who had completed ten years of service within the colonial army. At the same time, the French-sponsored *École Française de l'Extrême Orient*, established at Hanoi in 1898, contributed significantly to the study of Vietnamese history and culture and to the restoration of historic monuments.

POST-WORLD WAR I

Because ideas of political liberty were in vogue in 1918 and since Vietnam's manpower and economic resources had made substantial contributions to the prosecution of the war, hopes were raised in Saigon that substantial proposals might be forthcoming from Paris, covering both local autonomy and expanded self-government. In 1919, the departing Governor-General expressed confidence that a greater measure of popular representation in the colonial assembly would be accorded. However, the postwar constitutional concessions were minimal. Some 2,000 villages were authorized to elect local administrative councils, while 21,000 enfranchised taxpayers were permitted to participate in the Colonial Council election mentioned earlier. A Grand Economic Council, set up in 1928, included a majority of indigenous members selected from the local business community leadership. And Paris accorded Saigon autonomous authority—subject to French veto—to alter tariff regulations.

Actual policy determination and administration within Indochina remained, as before, under the firm control of the French Gov-

ernor-General, qualified only by the presence of large-scale capital-investment interests from France. The surviving facade of Imperial Court rituals which were still maintained at Hué helped psychologically to undergird governmental authority in Annam and Tonkin, but real control passed increasingly into French hands. The marked political oscillations within postwar France, especially with Socialist victories in 1924 and 1936, made little or no impact on colonial policy determination. Within Vietnam, indigenous economic and political unrest could safely be ignored by the Saigon authorities because reform demands (except for expanded educational facilities) were poorly articulated and because economic developments, until 1929, afforded expanding opportunities for employment.

Postwar economic development followed the same mercantilist patterns fashioned during the prewar period, except that the pace was greatly accelerated. Newly opened coastal canals were paralleled by a railway line connecting the Mekong delta with Hanoi, with branch lines running to the Cambodian and Chinese borders and up the Red River Valley to Yunnanfu. French holders of railway bonds received a guaranteed rate of interest regardless of chronic operation deficits, while French industry monopolized all orders for steel rails, telegraph facilities, and rolling equipment. Flood control embankments and docking accommodations were greatly expanded, along with urban amenities at Saigon and roadways radiating outward from the city.

Massive economic advances were registered after 1924, when the progressive deterioration of the value of the franc made Saigon a welcome refuge for French savings. During the course of the ensuing five years (until the depression of 1929), nearly three billion French francs found their way to Indochina. They were invested mainly in Cochinchina rice, rubber and tea plantations, and in mining operations in Tonkin. French subjects were permitted to acquire plantation lands in the hilly arc north of the Mekong delta at the expense of traditional claims of

hill-cultivating Moi tribesmen. In the end, three-quarters of the arable land of Cochinchina became alien-owned. Ample credits were provided by the Banque de l'Indochine, which developed a capital of three-quarters of a billion francs and a lending capacity of five to six billions. The desire to avoid local competition with French products dictated that little be done to develop North Vietnam's substantial industrial resources in minerals, textiles, iron and steel production. Vietnam's industry was confined for the most part to the processing of locally grown sugar, tobacco, tea and rice, with such processing factories employing around 80,000 workers. Transported workers from Tonkin were widely utilized in construction work, industries, and plantation development in the south mainly because such labor was abundant and dependable.

One effect of the development of Cochinchina was to accentuate the already more cosmopolitan character of its population as compared with more homogeneous Tonkin. In addition to the remnants of the ancient Chams and large numbers of Cambodians living in the delta area, an increasing number of Chinese moved in. Few economic opportunities were open to them in the north; they were particularly unwelcome in Tonkin, where traditional concern over the threat of Chinese domination persisted. By contrast, Cholon near Saigon became, in effect, a Chinese city. The Chinese controlled most of South Vietnam's river traffic, fishing industry, rice and copra trade, moneylending and local business trade. Chinese secret societies cushioned friction within the alien community and assisted members in evading governmental regulations and control.

Resident French citizens were also concentrated in Cochinchina. Some 72 per cent of the 42,000 resident French, as of the 1920's, were in government employ, either in the armed forces or in the civil service. They drew regular army and civil service pay, but were provided in addition with furnished living quarters of European standard, and with special overseas allowances. The latter were calculated in francs but were payable

in piasters worth four times the official rate. French citizens could be tried only in the two all-European courts located at Saigon and Hanoi. As a result no other area of the French colonial domain offered more attractive governmental employment opportunities than did Cochinchina.

This idyllic situation suffered a staggering blow during the world depression of 1929–1931, when world markets collapsed, with a corresponding decline of employment, profits, and revenues. But Indochina weathered the storm better than most parts of Southeast Asia. Additional public debt was incurred to provide essential employment, while the government and the Banque de l'Indochine collaborated to force creditors to revise downward the obligations of debtors. Additional loans were advanced to tide over strategic areas of the economy. The rapid recovery of the French market for Indochina rubber helped a great deal, and the restoration of normal production levels was fairly well achieved by 1935. Few investors lost more than 25 per cent of their equities and, by 1936–1937, the flow of investment capital from France resumed.

EFFECTS OF WORLD WAR II

The outbreak of the European War in 1939 and the eventual conquest of metropolitan France by Hitler's armies in 1940 inaugurated changes which proved impossible to reverse after the close of the war. Japanese troops occupied strategic positions within Indochina with the consent of the French puppet government, leaving only the management of routine administrative matters to the discredited French officials in Vietnam. Popular opposition to Japanese control eventually coalesced with anti-French nationalist spirit. Thus the firm reestablishment of colonial control after the close of the war proved impossible to achieve.

The Vietnamese nationalists, led by the Communist Ho Chi Minh, cooperated with the returning French in the spring of 1946 to accomplish the withdrawal of the undisciplined Nationalist Chinese forces (who had been authorized by the Allies to take the sur-

render of the Japanese). Ho was subsequently invited to France (June to September, 1946) to negotiate terms for Vietnam's new "independent" status within the emerging French Union. These negotiations were effectively sabotaged, meanwhile, by the unilateral announcement made on May 31, 1946, by the Saigon Governor-General, Admiral Thierry d'Argenlieu, that Cochinchina constituted a separate republic independent of the proposed Vietnamese state. Rebellion against the French developed in late 1946, several months after Ho's return to Hanoi. In an endeavor to develop a political alternative to Ho's popular nationalist movement, the French began in August, 1947, to negotiate with ex-Emperor Bao Dai to persuade him to return. The conversations with the cagey prince lasted for 20 months. A verbal agreement was signed in early March, 1949, and Bao Dai returned to Vietnam in late April. The last concession which he exacted from the French was an agreement ratified by the Cochinchina Assembly on April 23 that the Cochinchina district should be

(Continued on page 115)

At Ohio University since 1949, John F. Cady has taught history at numerous colleges across the nation and, from 1935 to 1938, in Rangoon. Among these was Franklin College where, from 1938 through 1953, he was also Dean. In 1943–1945, he was an analyst for the Office of Strategic Services in Burma and, in 1945–1949, he was a State Department officer in Rangoon. He was a Fulbright Scholar in 1955–1956; won Guggenheim Fellowships in both 1955 and 1961, and has served as Chairman of the Southeast Asia Committee of the Association for Asian Studies (1962–1965). His most recent books on Asia are: *The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954); *A History of Modern Burma* (same publisher, 1958); and *Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964).

How successful were the Geneva accords? According to this author, "A return to the Geneva Agreements in 1966, if that were possible, would be as unproductive a solution of the problems besetting the Two Vietnams as the agreements were in 1954."

The 1954 Geneva Agreements

By KENNETH P. LONDON

Director, Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, The American University

DURING ALMOST TEN centuries of Chinese domination, from 111 B.C. to 939 A.D., Vietnam was established north of the 17th parallel, a point at which the Annamite mountains almost touch the coast. The Vietnamese subsequently expanded southward during an 800-year period into the Saigon area, absorbing the kingdom of Champa and part of Cambodia.

Vietnam divided into a northern and southern kingdom at about the 17th parallel in the beginning of the seventeenth century and remained divided for almost 200 years until united by the Tay Sons in 1792. It remained for Nguyen Anh, who took the name of Gia Long, to consolidate the Vietnamese people, north with south, and in 1802 to found the dynasty which continued until the abdication of Emperor Bao Dai in 1945. In that year, for the convenience of the British and Chinese military commands, Vietnam was divided at the 16th parallel to accept the surrender of the Japanese.

French rule was reestablished in 1946. A subsequent 8-year struggle between the French and the Vietminh ended in an armistice in 1954 with the division of the country at the 17th parallel. The armistice was finally arranged after months of preliminary negotiation.

At a meeting of the foreign ministers of France, Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union in Berlin in February, 1954, it had been agreed to hold a conference to discuss the Korean and Indochinese problems. The conference, attended by the interested powers, opened on April 26, 1954, in Geneva. Before and during the early days of the conference, the United States sought support in London and Paris for massive air action at Dien Bien Phu to turn the Vietminh tide, which was drowning some 10,000 French troops. It was the drama of Dien Bien Phu that completed the disillusionment of the French public and forced the French government to negotiate a peaceful solution. By May 8, when the conferees turned their attention to Indochina, Dien Bien Phu had fallen.

According to Joseph Buttinger, the efforts of the United States to support France in Indochina had not only divided the United States and England

but also had split Washington into two opposing camps. However, those who demanded that the American Air Force and Navy prevent a Communist victory in Indochina—Vice President Nixon, Admiral Radford, Senator Knowland, and apparently also Secretary of State Dulles—were blocked by Congress when Churchill and Eden emphatically stated that England would not go along.¹

While seeking support in this venture, the United States was also attempting to secure a united front in London and Paris for a security organization in Asia to be established

¹ Joseph Buttinger, "The Miracle of Vietnam," in Richard W. Lindholm, ed., *Viet-Nam: The First Five Years* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1959), p. 13.

somewhat along the general lines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This would be set up immediately after Geneva to offset anticipated defeats at the conference table and on the field of battle. The ground was being prepared for the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

World-wide preoccupation with Indochina overshadowed the meeting of the 19 foreign ministers who convened at Geneva on April 26 to discuss Korea and, later, Indochina, and of the five Asian prime ministers who met at Colombo two days later to discuss colonialism and communism. The 19 foreign ministers at Geneva listened inattentively to speeches on Korea by the two principal foreign ministers faced with the problem: United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Premier and Foreign Minister of Communist China, Chou En-lai.

The serious business of the conference was Indochina, rather than Korea, because there seemed little likelihood of any significant agreement on Korea. Attendance of the People's Republic of China marked the first occasion when the five strongest powers to emerge from World War II sat at the same conference.

THE COLOMBO MEETING

Meanwhile, the five Asian prime ministers meeting at Colombo and representing India, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia and Ceylon were deadlocked in a three-day conference over the issue of intervention in the Indochina war. They were well aware that Secretary of State Dulles was in Geneva trying to mobilize support for such intervention; Dulles was also shuttling between Washington, London and Paris.² Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India, supported by Burma and Indonesia, argued in Colombo for a resolution calling for nonintervention by the United States, Britain, Russia and Commu-

nist China. By throwing a blanket over all the major belligerents, it was hoped that the concurrence of Pakistan and Ceylon could be obtained. But Pakistan was currently enjoying a military assistance "honeymoon" with the United States, much to the distress of Nehru.

British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden sent a telegram on April 29 from Geneva to the three Commonwealth prime ministers at Colombo asking what they were prepared to do to support a settlement on Indochina.³ A compromise resolution of three points was reached at Colombo calling for a climate of peace in Indochina, an immediate cease-fire, and a declaration of complete independence for Indochina.⁴ This resolution, contained in a communiqué of May 2, was followed on May 15 with a speech by Nehru asserting that India would accept an invitation to the Geneva Conference. On May 22, V. K. Krishna Menon arrived in Geneva for "informal" talks. And so India became an influential but unofficial attendant at the Geneva Conference on Indochina.

POLITICS AT GENEVA

The first session of the conference on Indochina was held in Geneva on May 8, 1954, with delegations from nine countries attending: Great Britain and the Soviet Union (serving as cochairmen), France, the United States, the People's Republic of China, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North), the State of Vietnam (South), Cambodia and Laos.

The People's Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North) had vested interests in assuring the successful outcome at Geneva of a Communist-led nationalist revolution. Their objectives, therefore, were less complicated than those of most other participants.

The Soviet Union was playing a double game with France and the People's Republic of China. With China, the Russians sought the success of Communist efforts in Indochina. As for France, the Russians were somewhat amused at her predicament and were taking advantage of it. France was in

² As the course of the Geneva conference moved from the stalemate toward decisions unacceptable to the United States, Dulles withdrew, leaving his deputy, Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, in charge.

³ Russell H. Fifield, *The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia*, (New York: Harper, 1958), p. 277.

⁴ *The New York Times*, April 30, 1954.

a quandary. While Britain and the United States put pressure on France to join the European Defense Community, the Russians were urging her to avoid such an alliance, probably suggesting that if France could be reasonable in Europe, the Soviet Union could be helpful in Indochina.

France needed the friendship and support of the United States but was ambivalent, even under American pressure, about ratifying the European Defense Community Treaty. The friendship was further strained as the Americans wanted the French to stand and fight in Indochina while the French wanted to back out. The French government wished to divert France's vanishing flow of manpower and treasure for reinvestment closer to Paris, perhaps in what seemed to be sounder colonial stock in Algeria.

France was also engaged in negotiations with a South Vietnamese delegation led by the minister of foreign affairs, Nguyen Quoc Dinh, regarding the specifications of independence for Vietnam. The delegation had arrived with its prime minister, Prince Buu Loc, on March 3. A joint French-South Vietnamese declaration was issued on April 28 looking toward Vietnam's total independence and the establishment of a French Union. Ironically, France was preparing to yield to South Vietnam what she was refusing to yield to the Vietminh.

The delegation of the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North) was under the leadership of Pham Van Dong who had been a representative of the Vietminh at the abortive Fontainebleau Conference in 1946. Dong was acting minister of foreign affairs and was an aggressive advocate of Vietminh requirements. He demanded recognition by France of Vietnam's sovereignty and independence, meaning the total national territory undivided, the withdrawal of all foreign troops, and general elections to consolidate Vietnam under a single government.

Dong also alleged that there were resistance

administrations in Cambodia and Laos which should be included in the Conference, the "Khmer" of Cambodia and the "Pathet Lao" of Laos. Sam Sary, the head of the Cambodian delegation, denied that a Communist Khmer existed let alone administered any Cambodian territory. Phoui Sananikone, the head of the Lao delegation, asserted that the so-called Pathet Lao had dissolved itself in October, 1949, and consequently controlled no Lao domain.

The South Vietnam foreign minister, like Pham Van Dong, opposed any consideration of partition, urged recognition of the legal government of Bao Dai over all of Vietnam, and accepted the idea of general elections under supervision of the United Nations.⁵

Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov, in a plenary session of the Conference on June 8, made a personal attack on French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, perhaps hoping to precipitate the issues with France over both the European Defense Community and Indochina. The resulting debate in the French National Assembly was unfavorable to the Laniel government which fell on June 12. Pierre Mendes-France formed a new government on June 17. Taking an aggressive public position, Mendes-France promised to put new proposals with respect to E.D.C. before the National Assembly before it recessed and to conclude a peace in Indochina by July 20 or resign.

The assertions of Mendes-France stunned the Americans, gratified the Soviets, gave the French public and the National Assembly a feeling that France was taking the lead, and implied that his confidence might have some basis in undisclosed understandings with the Soviets and the Vietminh.⁶

CONCESSIONS

An Indochina settlement began to take shape with concessions by Molotov that any cessation of hostilities should be supervised by a commission drawn from neutral nations (this having been urged by Krishna Menon), and with a statement by the Vietminh vice minister for national defense, Ta Quang Buu, that his government would be prepared to

⁵ Donald Lancaster, *The Emancipation of French Indochina* (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 319-320.

⁶ Lancaster, *op. cit.*, p. 325.

accept an armistice, a partition of the country at a point near Hué, and a regrouping of the opposing forces.

The situation was desperate for South Vietnam in the face of the successful Vietminh military who were continuing to press their victories after Dien Bien Phu at other points in Vietnam. In view of the anticipated diminishing role of France, it was imperative for South Vietnam to bring forward a leader acceptable to the United States. The uncompromising personality of Ngo Dinh Diem, who had been unwilling to serve with either the Vietminh or the French, seemed to offer faint hope.

The South Vietnam delegation completed its negotiations with the French defining the nature of South Vietnam's future relations with France. In a treaty signed on June 4, France recognized the sovereignty of the South Vietnamese government. The completion of these discussions was followed by the resignation of the Buu Loc government on June 19. Ngo Dinh Diem was named by Bao Dai to form a new government. Diem let it be known he would not include former cabinet ministers in his cabinet. Subsequently he arrived in Saigon June 24 without fanfare and established his government "composed of the Prime Minister's personal supporters and members of the Ngo Dinh clan"⁷ on July 5.

Events now moved swiftly. The Agreements included a Final Declaration of 13 articles providing for political arrangements and three agreements governing the cessation of military hostilities in Cambodia (33 articles), Laos (41 articles) and Vietnam (47

articles).⁸ Armistice agreements covering Vietnam and Laos were signed on July 20, fulfilling Mendes-France's boast that he would resign if he had not secured peace in Indochina by that date. (Incidentally, he shortly fulfilled his intentions regarding the E.D.C., and during a debate in the National Assembly on August 30, the proposed E.D.C. was rejected.)

The Cambodian armistice was signed last as the Cambodian delegation was aggressively insistent that there should not be a regroupment area for Cambodian Communists. In addition it insisted on the right, as a sovereign state, to establish bases for the use of foreign military forces if they were needed for national security.

Of the three states of Indochina, only Cambodia signed its own Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities. The agreements for Laos and Vietnam were signed by Brigadier-General Delteil, "For the Commander-in-Chief of the French Union Forces in Indochina." Ta Quang Buu, Vice Minister of National Defense of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, signed all three for the Vietminh. South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Tran Van Do declared at Geneva that his government would refuse to sign any cease-fire agreements partitioning the country but that his government would not use force to oppose the armistice.

The United States refused to support the Final Declaration.⁹ It would seem that Dr. Tran Van Do was familiar in advance with the sentiments of the United States government contained in a unilateral statement by the under secretary of state, Walter Bedell Smith, in the final plenary session:

The Government of the United States . . . takes note of the agreements . . . and (i) it will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them . . . ; and (ii) it would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern. . . .

In connection with the statement in the declaration concerning free elections in Vietnam, my Government wishes to make clear its position which it has expressed in a declaration made in Washington on June 29, 1954, as follows: "In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to

⁷ Lancaster, *op. cit.*, p. 329.

⁸ See *Conférence de Genève sur l'Indochine, 8 Mai-21 Juillet 1954; Procès-Verbaux de Séances, Propositions, Documents Finaux, Paris, 1955*; also Documents Relating to the Discussion of Korea and Indochina at the Geneva Conference; and Further Documents . . . London: HMSO, 1954, Cmd. 0186 and 9239; also a report of the committee on foreign relations, United States Senate, January 14, 1965, U.S. Government Printing Office. For the text of the Final Declaration, see pp. 113 ff. of this issue.

⁹ The Declaration of 13 articles providing political arrangements was an unsigned document. See Bernard Fall, "How the French Got Out of Vietnam," in *The Vietnam Reader* (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 87.

achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly."

With respect to the statement made by the representative of the State of Vietnam, the United States reiterates its traditional position that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it will not join in an arrangement which would hinder this. . . .

We share the hope that the agreements . . . will enable the peoples of that area [i.e. Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam] to determine their own future.

By not signing the agreements on the cessation of hostilities, the United States and the Diem government were free to develop their independent policies.

THE I.C.C.

Article 34 of the Vietnam Agreement provided for an international commission[†] composed of representatives from Canada, India and Poland, to be presided over by the Indian representative. The Commission was to supervise the implementation of the accords. The recommendations of the Commission could be adopted by majority vote except when dealing with questions concerning violations, or threats of violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities; in such cases, the decisions had to be unanimous (Article 42). This is a very important point to understand because the Commission was frequently confronted by issues on which Poland supported the Communist point of view, India more often than not favored North Vietnam, and Canada tried to be objective.

In writing of his three years of experience

¹⁰ See *Vietnam Divided, The Unfinished Struggle* (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964).

¹¹ Bui Van Luong, "The Role of Friendly Nations," in Lindholm, *op. cit.*, pp. 49, 50. Bernard Fall has observed that ". . . the Communist commanders had strict orders as to who was to remain in place and become a civilian; who were to remain behind in hiding as guerrilla fighters or Communist agents; and who was to go north. . . . Also sent north were many young boys over fifteen years of age, for further indoctrination and training." Lindholm, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

¹² Murti, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

[†] This commission has been variously called the International Control Commission, the International Supervisory Commission and the International Commission for Supervision and Control.

as the Indian member of the International Commission,¹⁰ Dr. B. S. N. Murti casts light on the problems of implementing the provisions of major significance: partition at the 17th parallel; a ban on new troops, equipment or foreign military bases; withdrawal of troops; regroupment of civilians; and general elections to unify North and South Vietnam. The difficulties of implementation in 1955 and 1956 might be encountered again in 1966 if there were to be a second Geneva Conference on Vietnam.

PARTITION AND REGROUPMENT

According to the Geneva accords, Vietnam was partitioned at the 17th parallel. The division was not without historical precedent, but civilian regroupment after partition was not so simple. The South represented the frontiers of the North, if one were a Northerner, and the North represented the heart of the Fatherland, if one were a Southerner.

Article 14 (d) provided that

any civilians residing in a district controlled by one party who wish to go and live in the zone assigned to the other party shall be permitted and helped to do so by the authorities in that district.

Bui Van Luong, the Director General of the Refugee Commission of the Government of Vietnam, reported that a total of 928,152 persons moved from North to South in the months that followed. These figures excluded military and quasi-military personnel. In contrast, "only a mere 4,358 persons of both sexes asked to leave the South to go North."¹¹

The movement of peoples under Article 14 (d) was one that the International Control Commission could not adequately supervise. The Commission could and did advertise the rights of the people to move peacefully, in a statement issued September 2, 1954, but it could only look into complaints of failure.

Initially the regroupment began on July 22, 1954, and formally ended May 18, 1955. It was actually extended until July 20. Murti reported¹² that ". . . a major portion of time and energy of the Commission had been spent on supervision and control of the provisions regarding freedom of movement.

The total number of mobile team investigations undertaken in respect of implementation of Article 14 (d) till the end of July, 1955, was 34 out of a total of 119 mobile team investigations," involving all other provisions.

GENERAL ELECTIONS

The problem of regroupment was related to Article 7 of the Final Declaration. Article 7, with respect to Vietnam, stated that

In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July, 1956, under the supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the Member States of the International Supervisory Commission, referred to in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from 20 July, 1955, onwards.

In 1955, the International Supervisory Commission was technically without firm legal ground in South Vietnam after the withdrawal of the French High Commissioner on April 28, because the French had signed the Geneva Agreements and the State of Vietnam had not.

On April 10, 1955, in anticipation of the consultations set for July 20, Nehru and Pham Van Dong in New Delhi "agreed on the importance of free elections and the achievement of unity of Vietnam as provided for by the Geneva Agreements."¹³ Ho Chi Minh visited Communist China and the Soviet Union just before the magic date. Ngo Dinh Diem said that he did not reject the principle of elections but insisted that they be absolutely free. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Eden and French Premier Edgar Faure also discussed the problem of Vietnam elections in a Geneva summit meeting.¹⁴ And so the heat was on to carry out the provisions of Article 7.

Murti, in Chapter X of his book, lamented

¹³ Allan B. Cole, ed., *Conflict in Indo-China and International Repercussions, A Documentary History, 1945-1955* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 236.

¹⁴ Fifield, *op. cit.*, p. 303.

the categorical attitude adopted by the Government of the State of Vietnam that it had not signed the Geneva Agreement and that it was not bound by its provisions. With respect to elections, Murti commented that

As the time approached for starting consultations between the competent authorities of the two zones from July, 1955, to discuss the general elections scheduled to be held in July, 1956, to unify the country as stipulated in the Geneva Agreement, Ngo Dinh Diem denounced the Geneva Agreement and refused to talk with the Viet Minh. . . . A number of anti-Geneva Agreement and anti-International Commission demonstrations took place in Saigon and other parts of South Vietnam between July 7 and 20, 1955.

The hotels in Saigon where the International Commission was housed were sacked. The Commission's Fourth Interim Report concluded that it could not work with effectiveness unless the difficulties were resolved by the cochairmen of the Geneva conference, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.

THE TWO VIETNAMS

Meanwhile, Ngo Dinh Diem took charge politically and deposed Bao Dai as chief-of-state by means of a referendum. He estab-

(Continued on page 116)

Kenneth Perry Landon has taught at Earlham College and has lectured at the University of Chicago, among other universities and war colleges. From 1955 to 1961, he was senior area specialist for South and Southeast Asian countries with the Operations Coordinating Board of the National Security Council. He has served in various capacities with the State Department since 1943. Earlier, he was with the Office of Coordinator of Information and the Board of Economic Warfare. From 1927 to 1937, Professor Landon was a missionary in Siam. Among his publications are *Siam in Transition* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1940) and *Southeast Asia: Crossroad of Religions* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1949).

In his analysis of the brief though troubled history of the two Vietnams since the 1954 Geneva Accords, this author finds that the American view "curiously, if unconsciously, resembles the American view of Korea in September, 1950, in that very strange phase of relative stability after General Douglas MacArthur's Inchon landing had cleared South Korea of invaders, but before the Chinese People's Volunteers transformed the Korean War into the bloody three-year stalemate it later became."

Vietnam: The New Korea

By BERNARD B. FALL

Professor of International Relations, Howard University

... American airstrikes and naval engagements against North Vietnamese fixed installations and warships have already taken place. ... In actual military effectiveness, the worth of such operations is nil. ... Primitiveness carries its own kind of invulnerability when matched against sophisticated weapons.

THE ABOVE PASSAGE, contained in this writer's article published in *Current History* for February, 1965, was written before round-the-clock bombing of North Vietnam began on February 7 of that year and therefore dealt with a hypothesis. The estimate of noneffectiveness, however, was made on the basis of earlier failures of similar operations in Korea¹ and during the French Indochina War,² and by December, 1965, was apparently confirmed by official American sources. "We had an assumption that North Vietnam was not going to reinforce the Vietcong forces in South Vietnam, as it has done," was the view of a senior United States officer in Vietnam at the end of year.³ In actual fact, however, North Vietnam seems simply to have kept pace with additional American reinforcements at the average rate

of two North Vietnamese regiments (about 3,000 men) for every American combat division (16,000 men). And thus, the Second Indochina War seems to grope its way slowly to a Korean-type "meatgrinder operation" that nobody wants.

It may, therefore, be useful to review some of the key events which have led to the development of the present situation. First of all, there are the Geneva Accords of July 20, 1954, examined in detail by a specialist in international law, Dr. Victor Bator, in his recent book, *Vietnam—A Diplomatic Tragedy*.⁴ They are remembered in the main for a clause contained in the final declaration of the Accords—and not subscribed to by either South Vietnam or the United States—providing for reunification elections to be held on or before July 20, 1956. They, however, also contained other important provisions whose progressive violation by South Vietnam also contributed to a climate in which retaliatory violations of the cease-fire provisions by North Vietnam would become almost mandatory.

¹ Robert F. Futrell, *et al.*, *The United States Air Force in Korea 1950–1953* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961).

² Bernard B. Fall, *Street Without Joy*, 4th rev. ed. (Harrisburg: The Stackpole Co., 1964).

³ *The New York Times*, December 13, 1965.

⁴ Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1965. Also see pages 79 ff. and pages 113 ff. of this issue.

Two examples of such violations shall suffice. The Geneva Accords provided for the creation, in addition to the Indian-Canadian-Polish International Control Commission (I.C.C.), also known as the International Commission for Supervision and Control (I.C.S.C.), of a so-called Joint Commission (J.C.) under Chapter VI of the Accords. The J.C., composed of military representatives of the North Vietnamese army on one hand, and of the French Union forces—which then included the South Vietnamese army—on the other, was to set up, in turn, Joint Groups of an indefinite number. According to Article 33, the J.C. shall

help the parties to execute the said [cease-fire] provisions, shall ensure liaison between them for the purpose of preparing and carrying out plans for the application of these provisions, and shall endeavor to solve such disputed questions as may arise between the parties in the course of executing these provisions.

Similar joint groups made up of the two hostile parties have been working in Palestine under the supervision of the U.N.T.S.O. (U.N. Truce Supervisory Organization) since 1948. While they did not bring peace all by themselves in the Palestine case, and perhaps would not have in the Vietnam case, they nevertheless have permitted in Palestine the maintenance of certain working contacts between Israeli and Arab officials on the ground level where incidents are most likely to occur. In the case of Vietnam, the government of the late President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam unilaterally abolished the Joint Commission and its subordinate teams on May 18, 1958, and expelled from South Vietnamese territory the North Vietnamese who had belonged to it. One could speculate today whether the Vietnam war would have become the desperate hate-fight it now has become, had there been *some* channel through which South and North Vietnamese officialdom could have communicated.

A similar example is Article 23, which allows the "graves service personnel of the other party" to search for and remove the

bodies of their fallen soldiers from the other party's zone. Existing war cemeteries of the other side were to be respected⁵ and, in a protocol subsequent to the Accords, the French were even permitted to erect an ossuary for their thousands of dead at Dien Bien Phu. Here again, the Ngo Dinh Diem government allowed again the pathological hatreds of its leaders to get the better of its political judgment: North Vietnamese graves registration teams were expelled and existing North Vietnamese military cemeteries and memorials for their war dead (notably, from personal observation, the cemetery and monument in Qui-Nhon) were destroyed.

In the case of North Vietnam, a Franco-Vietnamese graves registration mission composed of Captain Paul Belmont and Lt. Nguyen Van Sai had even been permitted to go to Dien Bien Phu in May, 1955; i.e., one year after the battle had ended, and had begun its surveys for the purpose of regrouping the war dead there into a permanent cemetery to be erected on the spot with a suitable monument. But that mission, and others, were expelled by North Vietnam in reprisal against the measures taken by South Vietnam. To this day, those dead remain unattended and unrecorded. However, and again from personal observation in North Vietnam in 1962, the old French military cemeteries of Bach-Mai and Vinh-Yen (the latter dating in part back to the colonial campaigns of the 1880's) show no evidence of destruction or molestation.

A similar fate surrounded the *only written agreement* ever signed by North and South Vietnam without foreign advice from either side: the postal relations protocol signed in Haiphong (North Vietnam, then still a part of the French-held perimeter) on April 12, 1955. The postal protocol could have become the working model of a whole series of other *de facto* accords covering such fields as economic exchanges, telecommunications and even, under optimal conditions, a limited amount of interzonal travel beyond the simple refugee exodus. It is exactly those limited interzonal agreements which make the situation between the two Germanies somewhat

⁵ Article 15(d): "The two parties shall permit no destruction . . . of any public property. . . ."

less explosive, and which make even the equally senseless Arab quarantine of Israel (which at least has its Mandelbaum Gate in Jerusalem) a bit more bearable. North and South Vietnamese postal relations started out on the basis of postcards which were the direct verbatim copies (in Vietnamese translation) of the Nazi-imposed postcards used for correspondence between southern and northern France during World War II. But even this pitifully slender thread of interzonal relations was the object, on May 21, 1956 (i.e., before the July 20 election deadline) of a complaint by the North Vietnamese postal authorities to the effect that five announced shipments of cards had simply "disappeared" inside South Vietnam before delivery and others had been delivered with delays of several months.

Finally, another article of the 1954 Accords—14(c)—provided that both parties would "refrain from any reprisals or discrimination against persons or organizations on account of the activities during the hostilities and to guarantee their democratic liberties." Both sides obviously violated that article, but again it was the Diem regime that openly forbade the I.C.C., as of mid-1957, to investigate allegations that former resistance members (even those who had not been Communists) were being pursued and imprisoned; a fact which the I.C.C. duly mentioned in its periodical activities report of November 4, 1957.

In other words, what augured ill for the future of the relations between the two Vietnams was not only the unilateral abrogation of the promise to hold reunification elections in 1956—*per se* an understandable point, since South Vietnam would have been certain to lose its existence in such an election—but the fact that Saigon had from the start hardly ever made an attempt to live up even to those articles of the Accords which would have somewhat sweetened the pill of North Vietnamese disappointment as it became clear in July, 1956, that reunification would not take place. It has been argued in some quarters that the North Vietnamese already "knew" at Geneva in 1954 that the division

between the two zones of Vietnam would be of long duration, if not permanent, and that their clamor for elections in 1956 was one for the record only. While that argument has no legal standing, it is difficult to believe that the North Vietnamese, having just *won* the war against the French, were willing to see their victory recompensed by a permanent quarantine by their South Vietnamese brother state. As far as the two Germanies is concerned, they also, by virtue of the Allied war-time agreements, were not to become separate states, but did. A violation of a variety of solemn agreements did take place here also. But in the case of the two Germanies, good sense, some diplomacy (totally absent in the Far East), and, above all, the realization that the failure to achieve a *modus vivendi* would lead to a world war, contributed to a situation which, though far from ideal, appears viable. In Vietnam, also, basic violations of central agreements could have been overcome in all likelihood by creating acceptable peripheral conditions; and, above all, by preparing South Vietnam internally for the confrontation with the North that was bound to come.

That South Vietnam did not do this will have to remain a matter of eternal regret, as the country must now pay for this omission by a murderous war fought on its soil. That its government was not the object of the most emphatic pressure on the part of its main supporter, the United States, at least to make a good showing of compliance to the signed agreements (or, at least, their nonobjectionable parts), must remain a subject of further study by later historians to whom, hopefully, certain needed archives will become freely available.

As far as North Vietnam was concerned, the choice of alternatives was limited. It could resolve to abandon all prospect of future reunification without the slightest *quid pro quo* in the economic field and integrate fully with Red China—a prospect no Vietnamese relishes, regardless of political leanings. Or it could remain watchful for any sign of internal difficulty in South Vietnam in the hope of being able to exploit it at the

right moment. South Vietnam did not fail to provide Hanoi with such an opportunity.

THE RISE OF THE VIETCONG

It is axiomatic in the field of revolutionary warfare that the potential insurgent takes his source of power from a population which (in the words of the United States Army manual of *Counter guerrilla Operations* [FM 31-16]) has "become discontented with existing conditions which cannot be changed by peaceful and legal means." That is close to a perfect definition of what was to happen in South Vietnam *not*—contrary to some later appraisals—after 1960 or 1961, but starting in 1956.

There is strong evidence that the population of South Vietnam at first considered the Ngo Dinh Diem regime to be a vast improvement over the succession of French-backed non-Communist regimes which had preceded it. In less than a year after the cease-fire, by mid-1955, Diem had succeeded in defeating one by one the so-called "political-religious sects," i.e., the armed Cao-Dai and Hoa-Hao⁶ units which had carved out quasi-feudal baronies in the South Vietnamese countryside. These sects were backed by the piratical Binh-Xuyen, who controlled the Saigon police, and even by a Catholic group, the *Unités Mobiles de Défense des Chrétiens* (U.M.D.C.), led by a Eurasian French colonel, Jean Leroy.⁷ Diem unfortunately failed to realize that his victory over the sects was largely due to the fact that the population supported him—not that the South Vietnamese army had suddenly developed a prowess and tactical efficiency it did not possess a few months earlier.

The same held true in the relations between the population and the stay-behind Communist cadres. There may have been about 6,000 armed "Vietminh" who had stayed inside South Vietnam after the cease-fire and after about 100,000 other persons

under Communist control had been transferred to North Vietnam (while 860,000 moved south). The purpose of those stay-behind cadres was twofold: if the reunification elections took place as planned in 1956, they would become the first on-the-spot authority of the returning Ho Chi Minh regime; if such elections did not take place, they would become the vanguard of a future insurrectional movement.

All Communist movements have a hard core of trained military or guerrilla cadres. Some of them may never have a chance to use their military or organizational skills; others do. It all depends on the *local circumstances*, and rarely vice-versa. Such Communist cadres will exploit occasions when they arise, but they are incapable of "creating" a revolution from scratch. It is Diem who created the movement of discontent in South Vietnam. North Vietnam and the Vietcong fed on it.

Here again, the record is clear: the South Vietnamese regime began to take on highly-resented police state features long before the guerrilla threat justified the adoption of some of them for the purpose of restoring internal security. Thus, on January 11, 1956 (i.e., *after* the non-Communist sects had been crushed and long *before* the Communist guerrillas began their operations) Diem issued Ordinance No. 6 which stipulated that by

decision of the President of the Republic upon proposal by the Minister of the Interior, may be sent to concentration camps . . . all persons considered dangerous to national defense or collective security.

And in June, 1956, the South Vietnamese government made perhaps its most fateful decision. In defiance of one of the most hallowed Vietnamese traditions, according to which the power of the central authorities stops at the bamboo hedge of the village,⁸ the Saigon administration abolished by a stroke of the pen elected village chiefs and village councils and replaced them by appointive members.⁸ In doing this, Diem outdid anything that either the North Vietnamese Communist regime or the French colonial administration ever attempted. The French (like

⁶ Cf. Fall, "The Political-Religious Sects of Vietnam," *Pacific Affairs*, September, 1955.

⁷ Jean Leroy, *Un homme dans la rizière* (Paris: Editions de Paris, 1955).



⁸ Gerald Hickey, *Village in Vietnam* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 182.

SOUTH VIETNAM

Taxation Compliance

1964

UNPAID TAXES (%)



almost all colonial powers) did not feel it necessary to interfere directly in village affairs; the Hanoi regime, while seeking to influence village administration, did so by the more indirect means of providing administrative *can-bo* (cadres) for the elected village chiefs. But the latter still were basically responsible to their villages.

In South Vietnam, elected village chiefs were replaced by centrally-appointed individuals who, in many cases, were not even native to the village and who, as insecurity grew, preferred to live in the nearby district town. This broke all normal feedback between the 80 per cent of the population which lives in village units of about 2,000 people, and the South Vietnamese government. Once the traditional and homegrown village administrative structure had been destroyed by the South Vietnamese regime, the North Vietnamese and their sympathizers had found the chink in South Vietnam's armor. In a well-organized terror campaign involving massive assassination and kidnappings of local officials, they began to dismantle the South Vietnamese local administration and to replace it gradually with their own men.⁹

Here again, what is called "insecurity" or "insurgency" shows up most clearly in the compliance of the Vietnamese with their taxation system, as the latter represents a type of governmental activity which no state abandons lightly. A radical decline of taxation may also show an overall degradation in administrative performance. In South Vietnam, both insecurity and administrative degradation in the cities are clearly illustrated in the country's taxation system, as evidenced by the map on page 89, based on a recent American survey of property tax assessments in that country.¹⁰

Of the 234 districts (*huyên*) into which Vietnam was divided in 1964, a total of 165 (or 71 per cent) failed altogether to respond to a central statistical tax inquiry. The re-

maining 69 districts (29 per cent) filed some sort of acknowledgement, and of those, 51 provided useful data of some sort for the year 1964. Overall, the following appalling picture emerged from the survey:

SOUTH VIETNAM TAX DELINQUENCY

Year	% Delinquent
1960	44
1961	47
1962	51
1963	57
1964	74

The survey, moreover, showed that the urban areas which are mostly solidly under government control had, in 53 per cent of the cases, a higher delinquency rate than the rural areas—which, of course, could not be attributed to insurgency but was, in the view of the American tax experts in Saigon, due to the fact that possibly "some officials are using 'insecurity' as an excuse for their own incompetence. . . ."¹¹ Or, for example, in some well-documented cases, the tax funds simply disappeared in a welter of corruption. Here again, the figures are obvious: even at a time when Communist subversion and North Vietnamese infiltration were at a low level, in 1960, the Diem regime was hardly capable of effectively administering much more than half the country.

And the political alternative to communism it offered at the center fully matched its performance in the countryside. One of Diem's most ardent defenders, Marguerite Higgins, was to say of him in 1965, when the record of his regime was clearly written all over the map of Vietnam:

(Continued on page 117)

⁹ "Vietnam: The Agonizing Reappraisal," *Current History*, February, 1965, p. 100.

¹⁰ Ray E. Davis, *An Analysis of Property Tax Compliance in Vietnam* (Saigon: U.S.O.M., 1965).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

Bernard B. Fall is the author of numerous studies and books on Indochina, including *Street Without Joy* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1964), *The Two Viet-Nams* (New York: Praeger, 1963) and co-editor of *The Viet-Nam Reader*, with Marcus G. Raskin (New York: Random House, 1965).

As he analyzes the military situation in Vietnam, this observer concludes that "The most serious military problem facing the United States in South Vietnam is really political rather than military."

Military Policy in Vietnam

By RICHARD DUDMAN

Washington Correspondent, St. Louis Post-Dispatch

AS RECENTLY as October 2, 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and General Maxwell D. Taylor, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported to the President with regard to Vietnam that "the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965, although there may be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S. training personnel."¹

Their prediction, long since overtaken by events, has been excused by the fact that it came just one month before the apparently stable government of President Ngo Dinh Diem was overthrown, but it was vulnerable at the time on other counts. It disregarded the strength and resiliency of the Vietcong, the support the guerrillas were receiving from the South Vietnamese people, the help already flowing in from North Vietnam, the false and overoptimistic intelligence reports being continually supplied by the South Vietnamese, the habitual overoptimism of American officials on the scene, and the shortcomings of the South Vietnamese forces. In short, it underestimated the enemy's potential and overestimated the South Vietnamese potential.

Continual expansion of the war since then has raised widespread doubts as to whether the official United States estimate yet matches the capacity of the Communist-led forces to

harass, burn and kill—and, moreover, to operate a shadow government—throughout most of a country the size of the state of Missouri.

As the number of American troops in South Vietnam presses upward toward the 250,000-mark, the war's duration and manpower limits are no longer in sight. The official word is that it could be a long war. President Lyndon Johnson has given what amounts to a public open-ended commitment to provide as many troops as the military considers necessary.

Some high military officers have spoken privately of a 10-year war—10 years more, that is—requiring one million American troops. And this is on the assumption that the fighting will remain confined to Vietnam.

The face of the war had begun to change dramatically many months before Diem's overthrow and assassination on November 2, 1963. In January of that year, when Admiral Harry D. Felt, Commander-in-Chief of United States forces in the Pacific, was still predicting a South Vietnamese victory in three years, a force of 200 Vietcong soldiers staged the first "stand-and-fight" battle of the war, holding their ground against 2,000 South Vietnamese troops supported by helicopters, airplanes and armor. The war already was moving toward Mao Tse-tung's second stage—mobile warfare by regular forces.

On the political side, Buddhist riots broke

¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, October 21, 1963, p. 623.

out in the northern city of Hué on May 8, 1963, exposing an explosive politico-religious tension that had gone unrecognized by most observers. It was powerful enough to lead directly to the collapse of the Diem regime.

"Cautious optimism" remained the official appraisal until early 1965, when the Johnson administration expanded the war in a series of actions recognizing that it faced a new and bigger war.

The first of these was the bombing of North Vietnam, which was announced as retaliation against a guerrilla attack on American installations at Pleiku on February 8, 1965. It was reported later that a contingent decision to bomb the North had been reached the previous December,² or even before the November presidential election in which Barry Goldwater had advocated bombing North Vietnam and President Johnson had by implication rejected the proposal.³

Later that February, the United States began using jet bombers inside South Vietnam for strikes against Vietcong targets. The big American ground force buildup began shortly afterward, and the United States acknowledged on June 9 that it was committing combat troops in Vietnam. The White House denied, as usual, that this constituted a change in United States policies.

A further step in the escalation came on June 17, when American B-52 strategic bombers from Guam began attacking reported Vietcong installations and areas with heavy conventional bombs.

² Professor Henry F. Graff, of the Columbia University Department of History, quoted William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, to this effect in an article, "Decision in Vietnam: How Johnson Makes Foreign Policy," in *The New York Times Magazine* of July 4, 1965, p. 7.

³ Charles Roberts writes in his new book, *LBJ's Inner Circle* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1965), that President Johnson told him in May, 1965, that he had decided to bomb the North four months before the attack on Pleiku.

⁴ Views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been reported frequently by Richard Fryklund, military reporter for the *Washington Star*, who is considered particularly well informed on Air Force thinking. He wrote on this point in an article published November 2, 1965.

⁵ Thomas S. Power, *Design for Survival* (New York: Pocket Cardinal edition, 1965), pp. 214 ff.

Top American military officers had advocated bombing North Vietnam for many years. Their view was well expressed more than two years before by General Curtis E. LeMay, then Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in a widely quoted remark: "We're just swatting flies when we ought to be shoveling out the manure pile."⁴ Nonetheless, their arguments rarely had gone beyond the private chambers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"PERSUASIVE DETERRENCE"

A public indication of what was expected of the bombing raids against the North appeared in a book by General Thomas S. Power, published in the fall of 1964, shortly after his retirement as commander of the Strategic Air Command.⁵ General Power wrote that a principle of "persuasive deterrence" could be used to bring limited wars and local aggression "to a swift and satisfactory conclusion, with minimum expenditure in lives, matériel and cost, and without excessive drain on our military resources." He described a "hypothetical operation" which he said could have been used at the time he was writing to stop the guerrilla activities in South Vietnam by cutting them off from support from the North.

Let us assume [he wrote] that, in the fall of 1964, we would have warned the Communists that unless they ceased supporting the guerrillas in South Viet Nam we would destroy a major military supply depot in North Viet Nam. Through radio and leaflets, we would have advised the civilian population living near the depot of our ultimatum and of the exact time of our attack so that civilians could be evacuated. If the Communists had failed to heed our warning and had continued to support the rebels, we would have gone through with the threatened attack and destroyed the depot. And if this act of "persuasive deterrence" had not sufficed, we would have threatened the destruction of another critical target and, if necessary, would have destroyed it also. We would have continued this strategy until the Communists had found their support of the rebels in South Viet Nam too expensive and agreed to stop it. Thus, within a few days and with minimum force, the conflict in South Viet Nam would have been ended in our favor. Beyond this, we would have gained immeasurably in prestige and in the credibility

of our determination to prevent further Communist aggression against our allies.

Whoever joined General Power in thinking that the raids on the North would end the war "within a few days and with minimum force," has of course long since been disappointed. Officials in Saigon and Washington soon began expounding a three-point justification for the air raids. They said that increasingly severe raids on the North would (1) persuade the leaders of North Vietnam that it was against their best interests to continue supporting the war in the South (2) interfere with the infiltration of men and arms into South Vietnam, and (3) give a lift to morale in South Vietnam.

As the months passed, North Vietnamese determination seemed to harden rather than diminish; infiltration increased rapidly; and even the initially improved South Vietnamese morale seemed to fade. Some officials began to argue that, while bombing the North might have been a mistake, the raids could not be called off without receiving some concession in return from Hanoi; to do so would be taken as a sign of weakness by both Hanoi and Saigon. It was about that time that Secretary of State Dean Rusk suggested that the United States would be willing to suspend the raids if Hanoi would, for example, withdraw its 325th Division from South Vietnam.

Another defense of the bombing raids, provided privately by policy-makers in Washington, was that while they were not successful in themselves, they served to refute those who had been saying that a few taps at the North would be enough to bring the war to an end. Thus the raids would prove once again that the place where the issue had to be settled was in the South.

Still another argument put forward by responsible officials late in 1965 was that so many American troops had already been sent to South Vietnam that the American people would not stand for their being shot at by North Vietnamese soldiers without there being a chance to strike back at North Vietnam

itself. United States policy was thus portrayed as being dictated by the earlier American escalation.

There were repeated indications, incidentally, that not all the air attacks were directed against strictly military targets. When two United States navy fighter-bombers strafed a South Vietnamese civilian bus in November, killing one civilian and wounding three others, the official explanation was that the pilots were new to the war and thought they were over North Vietnam. The incident occurred at Cam Lo, about eight miles south of the North Vietnamese border.⁶

The attack was the fifth reported occasion on which American pilots, thinking they were over North Vietnam, struck targets in South Vietnam or in the demilitarized zone that separates North Vietnam from South Vietnam. In the earlier incidents, bombs were dropped on a government outpost, a village and a bridge.

President Johnson has said that, while the Vietcong guerrillas were killing men and children in Saigon with bombs, the United States was bombing only war installations. "Concrete doesn't bleed," he said. But United States navy and air force pilots have told reporters in Vietnam that they had been told to "hit anything that moves" on roads leading into South Vietnam. The pilots exercise their own discretion on these "armed route reconnaissance" missions.

The ground war in South Vietnam, where most authorities still think the conflict will be decided, has changed in the last year from a relatively small guerrilla conflict to a much larger war fought much of the time by regimental or even division-size forces. At the beginning of 1965, the 500,000 or so South Vietnamese men under arms were still fighting a counterinsurgency war with the support and advice of about 20,000 American troops. The war was being lost. The Vietcong had a solid hold on a half dozen base areas that the government troops did not dare try to invade. In more than half the country, they could roam at will by night, collect taxes, draft recruits, and obtain intelligence information. Villages and towns were being

⁶ The incident and its implications were discussed by R. W. Apple, Jr., in a dispatch published November 26, 1965, in *The New York Times*.

overrun through the northern two-thirds of the country, and government officials and American advisers were pulling back into district headquarter towns and in some cases abandoning these in favor of provincial capitals.

When this reporter commenced a series of newspaper articles with the statement, "The United States faces imminent defeat in Viet Nam,"⁷ some officials expressed displeasure at seeing the hard fact in print, but there was no effort to contradict the report. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara supplied belated confirmation in November when he said, "We have stopped losing the war."

By the end of 1965, the B-52 planes were pounding reported Vietcong concentrations every day, and American forces had mounted to more than 165,000, plus another 50,000 on navy ships deployed off the coast. The United States buildup quickly outdistanced the North Vietnamese infiltration, which exceeded the American forces in Vietnam through 1964 and until the spring of 1965. Rapid Vietcong recruitment in the South, however, more than kept pace with the influx of United States forces. The troop ratio fell from about 5 to 1 (anti-Communist to Communist) to less than 3 to 1 by the end of 1965. Most authorities have considered that a ratio of 10 to 1 or better is needed to defeat an insurgent army.

A MILITARY SOLUTION?

In lieu of any move toward a political settlement, it became clear that the United States was seeking a military solution. Administration officials, speaking privately, said that the tide had turned last summer, with the landing of American combat forces and the development of close-in air support. The Vietcong's monsoon drive failed to cut the country in half as planned. The United States showed repeatedly that it had enough men and firepower, and enough helicopters to move them quickly, to counter the Vietcong ambush strategy.

As 1965 drew to a close, both the United

States and North Vietnam were adding troops rapidly. Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces occasionally stood and fought long battles of several days. At other times, they would fade off into the jungles and avoid sweeps by American and South Vietnamese forces. But it appeared that the enemy was not going to follow the pattern predicted by some American experts and revert to 100 per cent guerrilla activity.

VIETCONG ADVANTAGES

The enemy retained one advantage that it had had from the start. It continued to get food, shelter, recruits and intelligence assistance from the Vietnamese countryside. It got this vital help partly through terror and partly through the voluntary cooperation of those who believed the Vietcong and the National Liberation Front to be a true expression of South Vietnamese nationalism. United States officials and independent observers continued to differ among themselves as to the mix. It was clear, however, that murders of village officials, often cited by American officials as examples of terrorism, sometimes looked different to the villagers; what looked to Americans like the murder of a conscientious civil servant might look to the villagers like delivery from a grasping tax collector, a threatening military conscription agent, or a representative of a usurious moneylender or landlord.

Another enemy advantage was his poverty. He could easily carry his own food and bedding—a little rice and a hammock—and live for long periods in jungles or rice paddies, independent of any elaborate logistical support like that required by most American troops. Unfortunately, the French, and now the Americans, have accustomed most of the South Vietnamese troops to dependence on these supply lines.

A third advantage was almost limitless manpower. Pentagon estimates toward the end of the year put infiltration of regular North Vietnamese troops at 1,500 a month and predicted an early rise to 4,500 a month. But these numbers, big as they were, could not account for the full increase in estimated

⁷ *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, March 21-28, 1965.

enemy troop strength. Although the Vietcong was said to be drafting 14-year-old boys in central Vietnam in desperation, the populous Mekong delta in South Vietnam was said by informed American sources to provide a huge reservoir of additional troops as needed.

As the war changed its character, the Americans and South Vietnamese came more and more to depend on conventional warfare to fight a foe that was partly conventional and partly guerrilla.

There were significant exceptions. United States Special Forces, originally under the direction of the Central Intelligence Agency but later transferred to army control, continued to hold remote outposts and search for the enemy in the small patrols called for by their counterinsurgency training. They continued to teach South Vietnamese to do the same.⁸

Another exception is a small clandestine operation by a branch of the United States Information Service. Americans chosen for resourcefulness and trained to undergo hardship lead small bands of South Vietnamese into Vietcong territory on killing and sabotage expeditions aimed at disrupting the enemy's organization and infiltration routes. The idea is to play the same game as the guerrillas but play it better.⁹

Many dedicated American and South Vietnamese civilians see the conflict as essentially a political problem. Working largely through the United States Operations Mission, the foreign aid agency in Vietnam, these persons work to provide schools, health facilities, water supplies, better agricultural methods, effective village and hamlet political organization and other advantages intended to show the Vietnamese people that the government

wants to be their friend and not their enemy.

A NEW STRATEGY

But all these small operations, valuable as they are, have become minor items as the new strategy has emerged. The significance of the new strategy was first reported fully by Bernard B. Fall, a professor of international relations at Howard University, Washington, D.C., after an extensive tour of the South Vietnamese battlefields.¹⁰

Professor Fall concluded that one central factor in the Vietnam situation, although not yet recognized on the campuses in the United States and, to a certain extent, not yet in Hanoi and Peking, was that "the immense influx of American manpower and firepower, and the ruthless use of the latter, have made the South Viet Name war, in the *short run*, *militarily* 'unlosable.'" He emphasized the two qualifiers, warning that eventual victory might see a prostrate South Vietnam, destroyed by bombers and artillery and ripe for a new revolution.

American hopes for military victory rested firmly on overwhelming troop strength and overwhelming firepower. With the troop buildup, the Americans and South Vietnamese broke the familiar pattern of losing a battalion in an ambush and then losing more battalions that were sent as reinforcements only then to be trapped in a still bigger ambush. In the new war, massive reinforcements and devastating bombing and artillery support made a decisive difference. True, victory was costly for the American-South Vietnamese side, and the outcome often was inconclusive. Still routine enemy victories were no longer possible.

Hundreds of helicopters made it possible for American and South Vietnamese forces to reach any point in the country in less than an hour. Professor Fall reports an incident in which an American airborne outfit was mistakenly put down in the midst of a Vietcong assembly area. The outfit would have been wiped out in the French Indochina war, where the same thing happened several times, and until recently in the present war. But in this case, other helicopter units arrived

⁸ See *The Green Berets* by Robin Moore (New York: Crown Publishers, 1965), for a fictionalized but notably candid account of Special Forces operations in Vietnam.

⁹ See William Touhy, "A Big 'Dirty Little War,'" *The New York Times Magazine*, November 28, 1965, pp. 43 ff. Also Malcolm Browne, *The New Face of War* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), pp. 260 ff.

¹⁰ See his article, "Viet Nam Blitz: A Report on the Impersonal War," *The New Republic*, October 9, 1965.

promptly, bombs and napalm surrounded the reinforced position with a protective wall, and the Vietcong had to break off contact.

"Today in Viet Nam," Fall continued, "there is so much of everything that almost any kind of military error, no matter how stupid, can be retrieved on the rebound."

With the American buildup, the conflict became more and more an American-Vietcong war. Big engagements, battalion-sized and larger, were more likely to succeed if the planning was entirely American and was kept secret from the Vietnamese officers until the last minute. When the Vietnamese participated, the chances were greater that the Vietcong would learn of the action and slip away before it began. American officers attributed this variously to Vietnamese slowness in mounting an attack, poor security among the Vietnamese, even at high staff levels, and local accommodations reached by local South Vietnamese officials with Vietcong guerrillas in their areas.

An analysis of small unit operations, company-sized and smaller, shows that soldiers with United States forces are much more likely to meet the enemy than those with South Vietnamese troops. An official Pentagon weekly summary last November showed that 11.3 per cent of the American efforts made contact with the enemy, compared to only 0.4 per cent for South Vietnamese efforts. Officials attributed the disparity partly to the assignment of many American units as strategic reserves, available for combat against major Vietcong units, while many South Vietnamese units patrol from fixed bases where the chance of combat is less. Another reason given was greater aggressiveness on the part of the United States units.

Despite the occasional claims that the "free world" is engaged against the Communists in Vietnam, most of the 40 nations named as being on the American-South Vietnamese side are giving only token assistance. Some of these, it should be added, continue to trade with North Vietnam. Popular and official

opinion in many of them is cool toward United States policy in Southeast Asia. The only substantial troop contributions are from South Korea (18,000), Australia (1,300) and New Zealand (300). Nationalist China, on Formosa, is willing to send part of its United States-supported army, but neither the United States nor South Vietnam wants to see those forces in the war at present. They might trigger the entry of mainland China into the war, and they certainly would be unpopular with many South Vietnamese, whose traditional enemy is China more than communism.

INEVITABLE EXPANSION

Barring some unexpected movement to the conference table, further expansion of the war seems inevitable. On the American side, the prospect is for more troops, more intensive bombing of the South Vietnamese countryside in areas where the Vietcong is strongest, and more intensive bombing of North Vietnam. As 1965 ended controversy raged over whether to bomb the industrial port of Haiphong, 55 miles northwest of Hanoi, and even the capital itself, or whether to continue to hold these as "hostages." Advocates of more bombing still adhered in public to the official Administration position of restraint. In private, however, they pointed out that the war was escalating anyway and contended that an attack on Haiphong could cripple North Vietnam's economy and force the Hanoi regime to negotiate a settlement.¹¹

An American strategy in Asia has emerged in which the United States is putting more and more of its eggs in one basket to prove once and for all—it is hoped—that the Chinese-sponsored "wars of national liberation" must fail. The debatable assumption is that a Communist failure in South Vietnam would inhibit such efforts elsewhere. Critics of this strategy argue that insurgency warfare has its own sources of strength and can break out elsewhere regardless of what happens in Vietnam, just as victory over the insurgents in Malaya did not prevent the Vietnamese war. Another point raised is that Vietnam is unusual in that the French Indochina war left the Communists in full control of the forces

¹¹ See an article by Jack Raymond in *The New York Times*, December 2, 1965, page 3, for an account of military proposals for attacking Haiphong.

of nationalism and independence; non-Communist nationalism never had a chance to develop a strong organization and present an alternative to Communist leadership.

As the United States expanded the war, the strategy seemed to be approaching a thumb-nail prescription that sounded like hyperbole when it was quoted around Washington last summer. Persons familiar with policy discussions at the time said that "a Rotterdam policy in the North and a Dominican policy in the South" was being urged in the Central Intelligence Agency. By that they meant the saturation bombing of North Vietnam and the dispatch to South Vietnam of five times as many troops as seemed necessary.¹² On the Vietcong and North Vietnamese side, the immediate prospect was for an increasing infiltration of troops from the 250,000-man North Vietnamese army.

The big unanswered question was whether or not China, with its almost limitless manpower, would begin sending "volunteers" or enter the war openly. High Administration officials were saying in the last half of 1965 that the chance of direct Chinese or North Vietnamese involvement was becoming less and less. Some of their advisers, specialists in Chinese affairs, differed. They saw in reports of Chinese construction of rail lines and air fields near Vietnam a possibility that China would go to Hanoi's aid. They feared that China would feel itself driven to direct intervention to save North Vietnam just as it had felt itself forced to cross the Yalu River in 1951 to save North Korea from destruction.¹³

Another possibility that seemed open to the enemy was increased terrorism and sabotage in South Vietnam. Terrorist attacks on the American embassy in Saigon and on American troop billets and military headquarters were reminders of the vulnerability

of the many American installations. United States officials concede that such attacks cannot be prevented entirely. Still more vulnerable are the administrative and industrial centers that keep the economy of South Vietnam in operation. These have escaped major sabotage thus far only because the Vietcong have been living off the South Vietnamese economy.

Some observers have begun to liken the conflict to the Korean war, which was fought to a more or less satisfactory stalemate without general military confrontation by the major powers. But there are two substantial differences between that war and this. One is that the government of Syngman Rhee was a strong, nationalist regime, in full control of the country and enjoying strong popular support. On the other hand, the successive governments in Saigon have held only shaky control at best over a deeply divided and disaffected population.

The second, and related, difference is that the Korean conflict was a war with a front, while in South Vietnam the war is everywhere. Efforts to create the beginnings of a front—the strategic hamlet program, the so-called "oil spot" and "ink blot" theories, and the Hop Tac program aimed at the stage-by-stage pacification of the Saigon area—all have failed in a welter of false statistics and

(Continued on page 115)

Richard Dudman is one of the seven Washington correspondents of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*. He has been with the bureau 11 years, covering foreign and domestic affairs. His foreign assignments during that period have taken him around the world four times and have included a dozen wars and revolutions as well as extensive survey trips through Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. In 1965, he wrote a series of articles during a seven-week assignment in Vietnam and covered the revolution in the Dominican Republic. On the domestic side, he has covered stories dealing with the presidency, Congress, special agencies and pressure groups.

¹² For a proposal of a different strategy, in which the United States would halt the heavy bombing North and South and return to small unit counter-insurgency operations, see Roger Hilsman's testimony before the Senate Refugee Subcommittee, September 30, 1965.

¹³ For a report on these estimates, see an article by Max Frankel in *The New York Times*, December 3, 1965, page 1.

Analyzing the reason for the disintegration of the two-year-old Federation of Malaysia, this author comes to "the inescapable conclusion . . . that Malaysia's second year proved an unmitigated disaster."

Rupture in Malaysia

By C. PAUL BRADLEY

Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan, Flint College

THE MOST STRIKING feature of the partial dissolution of the two-year-old Federation of Malaysia in August, 1965, was the abruptness and finality of the break between the Central Government and the State of Singapore. At its advent in September, 1963, the gravest danger confronting the new Federation had been Indonesia's aggressive pledge to "crush Malaysia" as a British-inspired, "neo-colonial" creation. Yet within two years, internal divisiveness between the Malay-dominated Alliance government of Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman and the predominately Chinese State of Singapore, governed by Lee Kuan Yew's People's Action Party (P.A.P.), proved the decisive centrifugal force; in its

last months the conflict acquired an irreversible velocity.¹ The widespread original expectation that an enlarged multiracial state based on peninsular Malaya, independent since 1957, would enjoy a similar stability and prosperity appeared almost naive in retrospect. Now Malaysia was confronted with the same fate as the defunct British-sponsored federations of the West Indies and Central Africa.

When Malayan Prime Minister Rahman first proposed the formation of Malaysia in May, 1961, Singapore's adherence was the obvious keystone.² The Tunku feared that the left-wing extremists in the P.A.P. would succeed in outsting the moderate socialist leadership of Lee Kuan Yew, take over the government of an independent Singapore and fall within the orbit of Communist China. But with Singapore incorporated in Greater Malaysia, the Central Government in Kuala Lumpur could use its control of internal security to prevent a leftist take-over in Singapore. Simultaneously, to offset the influx of Singapore's heavily Chinese population, the more mixed ethnic groupings in Britain's North Borneo possessions would be added. The P.A.P. government, long an advocate of merger with Malaya,³ quickly endorsed the Tunku's proposal. In subsequent bargaining with Kuala Lumpur, Singapore won autonomous control over labor and education and, in exchange for 40 per cent of its state revenue, agreement to a Malaysian common

¹ This report is based on the author's field research in Singapore and also the Borneo States of Sabah and Sarawak in the summer of 1965; the research was supported by a University of Michigan Horace H. Rackham Faculty Fellowship.

² The separatist tradition was a long one. In nineteenth century British colonial administration, Singapore, with Malacca and Penang, comprised the Straits Settlements, apart from the other Malayan states. With the reassertion of British control after World War II, Singapore was separated from the two other Straits Settlements and administered as a Crown Colony, distinct from the Federation of Malaya. The British feared the inclusion of Chinese Singapore would increase the difficulties of administering multiracial Malaya with its delicate Malay-Chinese balance.

³ The P.A.P. had made a definitive statement of its policy on merger with Malaya in 1958, entitled "The New Phase After Merdeka—Our Tasks and Policy." For an appraisal, see the author's "Leftist Fissures in Singapore Politics," *Western Political Quarterly*, June, 1965, pp. 297-298.

market. Thus the island state would be assured a greatly enlarged internal market for its expanding industrial sector and presumably would become the prosperous "New York" of the new federation.

The P.A.P. extremists, fearful that an Alliance-dominated Malaysia would fatally inhibit their political future, left the party, organized the *Barisan Sosialis* and embraced a confusing succession of anti-Malaysian positions. In a carefully contrived referendum held by the P.A.P. government in 1962, the merger with Malaysia was approved by a 71 per cent majority.

POLITICAL RIVALRY

After Malaysia Day in 1963, Singapore proved too constricted a political arena for the restlessly ambitious P.A.P. leaders. Lee Kuan Yew was only *de facto* leader of a small Opposition in the federal parliament, tightly controlled by the massive majority of the governing Alliance Party. In April, 1964, the P.A.P. decided prematurely to extend its party organization to mainland Malaya and entered nine candidates in urban constituencies with large Chinese populations in the Malayan elections to the federal parliament. P.A.P. strategy was to impress Tunku Abdul Rahman and his United Malays National Organization (U.M.N.O.) with its anticipated voter appeal in urban districts, replace U.M.N.O.'s major Alliance partner, the Malayan Chinese Association, and share power in the Central Government. In U.M.N.O.'s hostile view, the P.A.P.'s ill-concealed objective was to make Lee Kuan Yew the first Chinese prime minister of Malaysia and add Chinese political domination to their existing stranglehold over the Malaysian economy. The inadequacy of the P.A.P.'s organizational effort was reflected in the defeat of all but one of its nine candidates.

The militantly pro-Malay faction of the Malayan U.M.N.O., headed by the Party's secretary-general, Syed Jaafer Albar, then joined with its Singapore branch in launching a heavy attack on the P.A.P. government in

its own bailiwick for failing to deal with certain local Malay grievances. Their most explosive charge was that large numbers of Malays were being heedlessly evicted from their *kampongs*⁴ to make way for a government redevelopment program. In this embittered atmosphere, two severe communal riots of never clearly determined origins broke out in Singapore during the summer of 1964.

An almost continuous volley of propaganda exchanges between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore ensued. The dominant tone of U.M.N.O.'s position was defensively communal. Before 1963, the argument ran, independent Malaya had enjoyed an enviable racial harmony. The federal constitution wisely took account of the obvious gap between the relatively impoverished rural Malays and commercially successful urban Chinese by granting the indigenous Malays certain privileges, most importantly sanctioning Malay domination of civil service posts. In nine of the eleven Malayan states there were hereditary sultans, the age-old embodiment of Malay political authority, serving as ceremonial rulers. After Malaysia Day this halcyon interlude had been interrupted by P.A.P.'s brash entry into national politics with its unsettling call for a noncommunal society. Despite P.A.P. disclaimers, U.M.N.O. leaders argued that P.A.P.'s agitation threatened a premature abolition of Malay special privileges. The P.A.P. position had exacerbated communal tensions, which, in U.M.N.O.'s view, was all the more reprehensible during a period of national emergency.

Reflecting its urban origins and the more sophisticated brand of politics endemic to Singapore, P.A.P. advocated a reorientation in Malaysian politics based on opposing economic interests that transcended ethnic divisions. In P.A.P.'s view, segregated communal parties in the Malayan Alliance had served mainly to perpetuate the privileged position of a few Malay traditionalists. The Alliance was inherently undemocratic, with the Malay elite sharing the spoils of office with "a few wealthy Chinese and a few fortunate Indians, who were chosen to represent the Chinese

⁴ A *kampung* is a Malay settlement or neighborhood.

and Indians respectively.”⁵ A more defensible politics, P.A.P. claimed, would pit the impoverished “have-nots” in all ethnic groups against the privileged “haves.” As a democratic socialist and noncommunal party, P.A.P. could expect to be a major beneficiary of such a reorientation.

Simultaneously, P.A.P. refused to be pushed into the anti-Malay role to which U.M.N.O. leaders had assigned it. P.A.P. had long endorsed Malay as the national language and since 1963 had supported the nation-wide National Language Months, designed to promote the wider use of Malay. P.A.P. insisted that it opposed the elimination of Article 153 in the federal Constitution guaranteeing Malay privileges. If national energies were devoted to accelerated economic development benefiting all ethnic groups, P.A.P. argued, Malays would no longer need to cling defensively to their special rights.

MILITANTS CAMPAIGN

Within U.M.N.O., the militants set out to mobilize Malay mass opinion in the rural *kampongs* for an unyielding defense of Malay privileges and an aggressive campaign to defeat P.A.P. pretensions of pan-Malaysian political leadership. Their chief mouthpiece was the influential Malay-language *Utusan Melayu*, whose relatively small reading audience was expanded by frequent oral group

readings. The most venomous attacks centered on Lee Kuan Yew, who was charged with casting slurring references against “obsolete” sultanates and denying the historical verity of the Malays’ status as indigenous “sons of the soil.”

Increasingly, the militants voiced demands for punitive measures against the Singapore government including Lee’s removal as prime minister. At this juncture, U.M.N.O.’s moderate leadership under Tunku Abdul Rahman, a veteran protagonist of racial harmony, demurred against a solution that might further inflame communal tensions. The stridency of the militants persisted, and speculation arose that an aging Tunku might lose control of his own party. In May, 1965, at the annual general assembly of U.M.N.O., where the Tunku was elected to his fourteenth term as president, he urged his party to “play down” its acrimonious exchanges with P.A.P. leaders and asserted that “every right thinking person and every business man feels that Singapore’s place is with Malaya.”⁶

Meanwhile P.A.P. sought fresh means of combating the growing influence of U.M.N.O.’s militants. First the P.A.P. government began to issue a weekly periodical, the *Malaysian Mirror*, as a major vehicle in its propaganda war with Kuala Lumpur. Among its regular features were translations from *Utusan Melayu* editorials. The *Mirror*’s intent was to infer that shrilly communal appeals inspired by the militants contradicted U.M.N.O.’s publicly professed ideal of multi-racial harmony. In June, the inaugural meeting of the multiparty Malaysian Solidarity Convention, under P.A.P. leadership, was convoked in Singapore. Embracing the slogan of “Malaysia for Malaysians,” the delegates approved a “crusade” to preach inter-racial unity. Their chairman, Toh Chin Chye, deputy prime minister of Singapore, asserted that “a united nation can arise only if one race does not aspire to be the master race but instead all citizens are equal, irrespective of race.”⁷ Disavowing any secessionist intent, the new movement’s leaders insisted they desired only to act as a “loyal opposition” to reduce the heightened communalism which

⁵ See Lee Kuan Yew’s article, “Dangers of Segregated Communal Parties,” *Petir*, official organ of P.A.P., April, 1965, p. 7.

⁶ “Malaysian Bulletin,” Embassy of Malaysia, Washington, D.C., No. 18, June, 1965, p. 8. Writing in a similar vein in the July, 1965, issue of the American periodical, *Foreign Affairs*, Tunku Abdul Rahman pointed out that “they [Singapore’s leaders] are quick to criticize the central government at every opportunity, principally because their own state is run by an opposition party. . . . I myself have no doubt that as Singapore continues to make further progress in Malaysia and adapts itself more readily through experience and understanding of the cooperation necessary in a federal structure, these pangs of local pride and wishes for dominance will slowly pass away.”

⁷ *The Straits Times* (Singapore), June 7, 1945. Dr. Toh also alluded to the delicate national language issue. While acknowledging a national language as a “great asset” in nation-building, he labeled as “foolish” the belief that a common language could only unify the nation. U.M.N.O. militants were identified with a vigorous extension of the use of Malay by non-Malays in Malaysia.

threatened to disrupt the young federation.

The Solidarity Convention had its own problem of intragroup unity. In addition to P.A.P., the participant parties were the People's Progressive and United Democratic parties from peninsular Malaya; the moderate faction of the leftist Sarawak United People's Party (S.U.P.P.), which provided the major opposition to the local Alliance government there; and the much smaller Party, *Machinda*, only recently formed in Sarawak. These parties ranged from center right to far left on the Malaysian political spectrum. In the pre-Malaysia period, only P.A.P. had been an enthusiastic advocate of the proposed federation. P.A.P. and S.U.P.P. were the only mass parties with substantial support, both representing insular Malaysia. The prospect of affiliation with the Solidarity Convention provoked an internal crisis within S.U.P.P., with its extremist faction opposed.⁸ The fragile unity of the new movement appeared to rest mainly on its members' shared fear of Malay communalism. U.M.N.O. critics quickly drew attention to the predominance of Chinese leadership in the Solidarity grouping and charged that its noncommunal stance deliberately obscured the political ambitions of its Chinese leaders.

A stormy parliamentary session at the end of May had marked a culminating point in the prolonged dispute. P.A.P.'s Lee submitted a motion of censure against the Alli-

ance government for failing to include a firm commitment to a Malaysian Malaysia in the Royal Address. Lee also publicly inferred that the Monarch's ambiguous reference to the nation's "internal enemy" was actually directed against P.A.P. since the U.M.N.O. organ, *Utusan Melayu*, was employing the same language in its anti-Lee diatribes. He warned that supporters of a truly noncommunal Malaysia might be forced to consider "alternative arrangements" in face of intransigent Malay hostility. Alliance spokesmen in the House quickly charged Lee with espousing the partition of Malaysia by secession of states with non-Malay majorities, leaving only a central core of Malay states in the federation.

Particularly caustic was the speech made by Finance Minister Tan Siew Sin, who as M.C.A. leader within the Alliance had been P.A.P.'s chief target in the 1964 election campaign. Tan scathingly characterized Lee as leader of a "disloyal" opposition for his impolitic criticism of the Malaysian government while an overseas guest of Australian and New Zealand officials in March.⁹ Tan pessimistically concluded that cooperation between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore was impossible as long as Lee headed the Singapore government. P.A.P. gave no indication of a willingness to sack Lee.

In a revealing press conference before departing for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London in June, Prime Minister Rahman deplored as "unwise" the incessant talk by P.A.P. about the "racial composition" of the Malaysian population and its deprecatory statements on "feudal" Malay sultans. He recalled that before Malaysia Day he had spent "hours and days listening to Mr. Lee's proposals and reasons and what-not for joining Malaysia" and that he was prepared to spend further hours to ascertain "what is giving him all these worries and anxieties." The Tunku ruefully concluded that if he had not listened so attentively to Lee's persuasive talk on the need for an enlarged Federation, "then Malaya would still be a very happy Malaya—no confrontation, nothing."¹⁰

⁸ At a S.U.P.P. convention held in Kuching in June, a motion, sponsored by moderate leaders, Ong Kee Hui and Stephen K. T. Yong, which called for a three-month S.U.P.P. trial membership in the Solidarity Convention, was defeated by the temporarily ascendant extremist faction. There ensued an interregnum when Ong and Yong withdrew from their leadership positions. The extremists, long-time opponents of the Malaysian concept, were hostile to an acceptance of Lee Kuan Yew's leadership in the Convention. Lee had been identified with the elimination of their pro-Communist counterparts in the P.A.P.

⁹ Text of the Tan Siew Sin's speech in Parliament, Malaysian Information Service, Washington, D.C., June 18, 1965, p. 10. A probable unstated motive for Lee's visit to the two Commonwealth countries was to bolster his position vis-a-vis the Alliance government by winning influential new friends abroad.

¹⁰ *The Straits Times* (Singapore), June 13, 1965.

The Tunku's closest governmental associates soon proved markedly less patient. Acting Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak asserted that the P.A.P. government's "uncooperative spirit" was delaying the extension of the Central Government's rural development program to Singapore Malays. Finance Minister Tan, pointing out Malaysia's increased defense costs due to the Indonesian confrontation, called for a revision in the pre-Malaysia agreement limiting Singapore's contribution to the federal treasury to 40 per cent of state revenues. Kuala Lumpur announced it would proceed with the closing down of the Peking-controlled Bank of China in Singapore, despite P.A.P. protestations. In July, the Central Government ordered the expulsion of Alex Josey, a veteran British correspondent in Singapore who had long been a close adviser to Lee Kuan Yew on press matters. Josey was charged with interfering in Malaysia's internal affairs and indulging in activities which allegedly were "disrupting interracial harmony." The P.A.P. retorted that Josey's expulsion was merely an "appetizer" to whet the appetite of U.M.N.O. extremists for the "main dish," the arrest of Lee. A federal cabinet official countered that the Alliance government "would never make a martyr" of the Singapore prime minister.¹¹

ENFORCED SECESSION

Apparently fearful that he could not resist for long the militants' pressure for punitive measures against the P.A.P. government, Prime Minister Rahman reluctantly decided while abroad that Singapore's enforced withdrawal from the federation was the preferred

course.¹² Returning home, he immediately held confidential consultations with Lee, who reportedly urged the less drastic alternative of granting Singapore wider autonomy. The Tunku remained adamant. The P.A.P. cabinet was summoned to sign the formal separation agreement. Hastily assembled, the Alliance-controlled parliament swiftly approved a constitutional amendment providing for Singapore's withdrawal.

In an exculpatory statement before parliament, Prime Minister Rahman charged that the "position of the Central Government, not only at home but worse still abroad, has been mocked on many occasions." Taking repressive measures against a few officials of the Singapore government would be "odious," he said, without solving the larger problem of communal frictions, now so grossly inflamed by P.A.P.'s agitation. Alluding to Lee's overweening ambitions, Rahman insisted that "there can be only one Prime Minister for the nation and so, the best course we can take is to allow Lee Kuan Yew to be the Prime Minister of an Independent Singapore." The Tunku stated that his original expectation that Singapore would become the New York of Malaysia had been frustrated by the P.A.P. leaders' preoccupation with advancing their "personal glorification" at the expense of Singapore's true interests. With the Tunku's dream "shattered," the cosponsors of Malaysia had "come now to the parting of the ways."¹³

Simultaneously, in Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew held a press conference to announce the unscheduled independence of the island state. In an atmosphere charged with emotion Lee uncharacteristically broke into tears, forcing a temporary interruption. The enforced secession was clearly a bitter blow to the man who played so central a role in the formation of Malaysia. Only a shared awareness of the imminence of "big communal trouble" had induced the P.A.P. leaders to resign themselves to the Tunku's decision. Lee sadly observed that he did not expect a "healing of the breach" in his lifetime.

Certain important links remained between the two states. In the Separation Agreement

¹¹ *Ibid.*, July 21, 1965.

¹² In a letter to P.A.P.'s Dr. Toh, Prime Minister Rahman wrote that if he had been "strong enough and able to exercise complete control," he might have delayed action on Singapore. In releasing the letter for public consumption the P.A.P. charged that the "extremists are taking over," *The Straits Times*, August 11, 1965. An indignant Tunku insisted that he meant only that he might not be able to control his own impulses to act repressively against the P.A.P. Significantly, however, the principal spokesman for the militants, Syed Jafer Albar, resigned as Secretary-general of U.M.N.O.

¹³ "Malaysian Prime Minister's Statement on Separation of Singapore," Malaysian Information Service, Washington, D.C., August 10, 1965.

they pledged themselves to render to each other "reasonable and adequate" assistance in external defense. A Joint Defense Council was set up to supervise this military cooperation. Neither government would enter into a "treaty or agreement" with a foreign country that would be "detrimental" to the national interest of the other. A "willingness" to cooperate in economic affairs, crucially important to Singapore, was not amplified. For the time being, the Anglo-Malaysian Defense Treaty, indispensable for continued opposition to Indonesian confrontation, would remain in force with the British bases in Singapore available for the external defense of both States.¹⁴ In ensuing months it became clear that the Separation Agreement facilitated only the immediate transition period and did not signal the beginning of a sound relationship between the two states.

In contrast to the pro-Western, anti-Communist foreign policy consistently followed by Malaysia, independent Singapore embraced the alternative of nonalignment. The new foreign minister, S. Rajaratnam, announced that Singapore would not "automatically side with one of the Power blocs against the other" and would carefully weigh each international issue against Singapore's own interest. Certain complications militated against a strict application of this conventional neutralist position. Singapore was already committed to contribute to the military defense of Malaysia, which implied a negative judgment against Indonesian confrontation. The government had also sanctioned the retention of British bases in the island state, which exposed Singapore to the same "neocolonialist" thesis Indonesia had voiced against Malaysia. The collapse of the projected Malaysian common

market adversely affected the availability of proximate markets for the expanding output in Singapore's new factories. The P.A.P. government stated that its search for alternative markets would have very high priority, and that a resumption of its substantial trade with Indonesia, interrupted by confrontation, would be welcomed. The Malaysian government promptly announced that it would take "appropriate steps" to prevent the establishment of close relations between Singapore and Indonesia.¹⁵

Singapore's adoption of nonalignment was partly motivated by its eagerness to be admitted to the Afro-Asian bloc and hence play a larger role in world politics. A high-level government mission, headed by Dr. Toh, was appointed to visit a large number of Asian and African countries and woo their support for the new state. Simultaneously, Prime Minister Lee assumed a stridently anti-American stance. He suddenly revealed an earlier attempt by the United States Central Intelligence Agency to offer him a huge bribe in order to prevent public disclosure of the activities of Agency operatives in Singapore. Lee also warned that if Washington eventually assumed Britain's responsibilities for the defense of Malaysia, his government would seriously consider inviting the Soviet Union to administer Singapore's military bases. These remarks represented obvious ploys to impress Indonesia and other members of the neutralist camp.

Despite their initial pledges of economic cooperation, Malaysia and Singapore were shortly engaged in a commercial war. Both states imposed quantitative import restrictions on each other's goods, virtually halting trade across the Causeway. Negotiations to resuscitate the Common Market apparently failed, when the Federation announced in early October the erection of a new tariff wall against Singapore imports. Singapore retaliated with a similar schedule. The immediate effect was that each state would proceed competitively with its separate industrialization program rather than working out a shared distribution of new industrial plants.

Aroused by the Malaysian tariff policy,

¹⁴ Constitution and Malaysia (Singapore Amendment) Act, 1965.

¹⁵ The Indonesian reaction to Singapore's secession was surprisingly restrained. Djakarta claimed that the Malaysian fissure confirmed its view of the Federation's premature formation. A willingness to establish diplomatic relations with Singapore was indicated. Following the abortive September 30 coup against President Sukarno, Indonesia was preoccupied with the internal struggle between the Army and the Communists, so that the guerrilla campaign in Malaysian Borneo temporarily slackened.

Prime Minister Lee issued a vitriolic blast against the Alliance government which precipitated a fresh political crisis between the two states. Addressing a trade union group in mid-October, Lee advised Singapore workers they must steel themselves for at least two years of intensive economic competition with Malaysia. He presented a sharply delineated contrast between the supposedly superior facilities of Jurong, Singapore's principal industrial estate, and the Federation's counterpart at Petaling Jaya. Praising the "tremendous skill" of Singapore's labor force, Lee asserted that "if they (the Alliance government) think they can squat on a people that has got that capacity, I say they have made the gravest mistake of their lives." Lee charged that the underlying Malaysian intent was to "slow down our pace so that their society—a medieval feudal society—can survive." He included a sweeping attack against the alleged corruption and inefficiency of the Alliance government and a caustic reference to the "bowing and scraping" before the anachronistic and socially useless sultans.¹⁶

In Kuala Lumpur, Prime Minister Rahman quickly characterized Lee's speech as an "unwarranted and mischievous attack" against a friendly country and flatly refused to take "any lessons from the prime minister of Singapore on how to run our country." Sensitive to the communal aspects of Lee's speech, the deputy prime minister, Tun Razak, charged that Lee had "broken his unqualified undertaking not to make statements on our internal affairs." The Malaysian government then presented a formal diplomatic protest to Singapore's representative in Kuala

Lumpur, stating that Lee had indulged in "irresponsible criticisms" that constituted "wanton" interference in Malaysia's domestic affairs. The note warned that the continuation of such attacks would lead to a "serious deterioration" in relations with Singapore.

Singapore's abrupt exclusion from Malaysia had also activated fresh strains in the Central Government's relations with the Borneo states. As constituent members of the Federation, both Sabah and Sarawak resented the Tunku's failure to consult them on Singapore's departure. In their view, this calculated oversight downgraded their status to that of the nine states in the original Federation of Malaya and ignored their special position under the 1963 Malaysian constitution.

Agitation for a loosening of ties with Kuala Lumpur was particularly marked in Sabah. Dato Donald Stephens, one-time chief minister of Sabah, resigned from his federal cabinet post. He resumed an active role in the politics of his home state as leader of the Kadazan political grouping, a participant in the multiparty local Alliance government. His became the most influential voice advocating a change in Sabah's constitutional status.

In Sarawak, the opposition S.U.P.P. represented a more radical position. Before Malaysia Day, S.U.P.P. had strongly opposed the formation of the new federation, and afterwards only its moderate leaders acknowledged a willingness to work within the Malaysian framework. An undetermined number of the members of its extremist faction had since 1963 collaborated with Indonesians in their sporadic raids along the southern border of Sarawak. With Singapore's departure, S.U.P.P. now demanded a fresh test of Sarawak opinion on continued adherence to Malaysia and reiterated its own preference for a separate Bornean Federation, comprising Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei.

The Alliance government made it clear that it would block any attempt by Sabah and Sarawak to follow Singapore out of the federation and turned a deaf ear to pleas for immediate constitutional revision. The

¹⁶ *The Straits Budget*, October 27, 1965. Lee scornfully contrasted Malaysia's retention of the undemocratic sultanates with the parallel elimination of tribal chiefs in Africa. "I am told sometimes, they [the African chiefs] have got stools on which they sit which are ornately carved, painted in gold, some really of gold and inlaid with diamonds, jade and so on. Whoever owns the stool is chief. Now, it is, 'Move out, I am chief.' 'Who says you are chief?' and he says, 'The people voted me in. Out you go. I am there.' So the president moves in, with due ceremony." In Lee's view the whole rationale of the Malaysian concept—logic, history, geography, economic—had all been "sacrificed to preserve the orchid from within" (i.e., the traditional Malay social order).

Tunku's subsequent placatory visit to the two states reportedly did not mollify their ruffled feelings.

The Central Government held two major advantages in arresting the now alarming centrifugal tendency within the federation. Both Sarawak and Sabah were almost wholly dependent on Malaysian and Commonwealth military forces to prevent further Indonesian incursions. Both states also sorely needed substantial financial assistance from the Central Government for the rapid development of their relatively backward economies; this had already been promised by Kuala Lumpur in its projected Malaysian Five Year Plan in 1966. But in both Sabah and Sarawak, the local Alliance governments were formed by weakly integrated multiracial coalitions that had suffered repeated cabinet crises. The projected local elections in Sabah might precipitate a political realignment and the formation of a Sabah government markedly less friendly to Kuala Lumpur. The fluid internal situation in Indonesia could conceivably result in a more flexible policy toward Malaysian Borneo, thus setting up an almost irresistible counterattraction to Kuala Lumpur.

DISASTROUS CRISIS

The inescapable conclusion is that Malaysia's second year proved an unmitigated disaster. In the final crisis with Singapore, Prime Minister Rahman and his immediate advisers had exhibited a marked inflexibility in weighing possible alternatives to Singapore's ouster. The prolonged dispute had revealed the full dimensions of internal cleavage within U.M.N.O. Secretary-General Albar's resignation alone scarcely assured the future dominance of the moderates. With the Tunku in the last years of his leadership, the caliber of his successors was a cause for legitimate concern. A similar lack of finesse characterized Kuala Lumpur's conduct of relations with the disgruntled Borneo states. It appeared impossible for the Central Government to treat the Bornean leaders as true partners in a joint enterprise. A certain arrogance by the peninsular Malays in dealing

with the indigenous peoples of Sabah and Sarawak persisted.

Nor was the P.A.P. leadership in Singapore blameless. The articulate Lee apparently could not resist driving every point of his logical analysis to its starkest conclusion. His oratorical style, extremely effective in his own hustings, was offensively tactless when addressed to the proud and sensitive Malays. In the difficult days after independence there was a near-hysteria in several of Lee's public acts, which augured ill for weathering future crises.

The trade war between Malaysia and Singapore defied every principle of economic rationality. From the outset the most plausible justification for an enlarged federation had been the opportunity it would afford its constituent members for balanced economic development. Resorting to retaliatory tariffs would probably result in diminished economic activity for both states. The loss of an enlarged market for its finished goods would be particularly acute for Singapore's less diversified economy.

Finally, the partial dissolution of Malaysia was an obvious setback to the Western bloc. The assumed logical progression of the domino theory was in disarray. Britain was critically reevaluating the long term viability of its Singapore bases. The eclecticism in Singapore's new foreign policy was scarcely reassuring to the West. Prime Minister Lee's anti-American position carried with it a personal animus. The fragmentation of Malaysia would in all probability encourage Indonesia's expansionist impulses. As in Ceylon, Cyprus and British Guiana, the costs of ethnic separateness in the Federation of Malaysia ran high.

C. Paul Bradley has written several articles on political party systems in such diverse places as Jamaica, British Guiana and Singapore. He spent three months in Malaya and Singapore in the spring of 1963 and the summer of 1965 in Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore.

Pointing out that "the American effort in Vietnam has had repercussions within the whole of Southeast Asia . . .," this specialist underlines the dilemma for future United States policy in this area: "Where will the United States be when the fighting stops, as it must sometime?" Can the United States manage to reconstruct the area "without acting like (or in fact becoming) an imperial power in this part of the world?"

U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia: What's Ahead?

By WILLIAM C. JOHNSTONE

*Professor of Asian Studies, School of Advanced International Studies,
The Johns Hopkins University*

IN THE RAPIDLY changing world of international politics, events and circumstances have a way of overtaking and sometimes outrunning foreign policy. When this happens, it is wisdom to reexamine the basic assumptions upon which all policy is based. This is true for American policy in Southeast Asia and particularly for the conduct of our war in Vietnam. As a result of rapidly changing events in the last five months of 1965, there is only one conclusion that can be stated affirmatively about United States policy in Southeast Asia: it is high time for some thorough reappraisals, no matter how agonizing the process. This is the message that more and more thoughtful Americans are trying to get across. This is the message which appears in almost every responsible commentary on the war in Vietnam. In this situation, there is little to be gained by recalling past mistakes or errors of judgment. It is important, however, to look at the record of the past twelve months, appraise the changed situation and identify some of the basic policy problems that must now be re-examined.

In February, 1965, United States military forces in South Vietnam were under 25,000.

By December, there were at least 165,000 American troops in South Vietnam plus another 50,000 in the Seventh Fleet Task force assigned to the area. Reports in Washington during December indicated that a further buildup, to as many as 300,000 or even 400,000 men, would be a definite possibility by late spring, 1966. If this occurred, such a commitment of United States forces would match that of the Korean war. It was not until February, 1965, that the United States commenced its "selective" bombing in North Vietnam and began to provide increased air power in support of the forces in South Vietnam fighting the Vietcong. By December, the reported totals of bomb tonnage unloaded in both North and South Vietnam had grown so large as to have little meaning for the average observer.

This escalation of the war by the United States was alarming enough. But what was more important was the fact that it was matched by the Vietcong and the Hanoi regime at almost every step. Last May, there was the usual flurry of news reports and commentary that the Vietcong would attempt a massive "monsoon offensive" when, presumably, United States air power would be in-

hibited by the rains and clouds from giving close support to ground troops. At the end of the summer, most observers conceded that the "monsoon offensive" had failed of its apparent objective of cutting South Vietnam in half along the line through Pleiku to the Laos border. As the skies lightened it became apparent that, contrary to basic American assumptions, this partial failure of the summer offensive had not induced the Ho Chi Minh regime to consider negotiations, but had only hardened its resolve to commit larger forces to the defeat of the Americans in South Vietnam.

The series of battles in the Iadrang Valley and around the Michelin rubber plantation in November, 1965, revealed, as stated by Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, that regular units of the North Vietnamese army had been infiltrated into the south and committed to a "stand-up and slug-it-out" battle with American and Vietnamese forces. The Secretary reported after his seventh inspection trip to Vietnam late in November that there were from seven to nine regiments of the regular North Vietnamese army operating in the central highlands of South Vietnam. He also estimated that the rate of infiltration of trained, armed regulars from the North would increase from 1,500 per month to as many as 4,500 by the beginning of 1966.

What did these facts portend? According to official reports, there might be two divisions and part of a third division of regular North Vietnamese army troops in battle positions in South Vietnam by the first of the year. This would be a minimum of 15,000 to 20,000 regular North Vietnamese army troops committed to the war in the next few months. In addition to this counter-escalation by the Hanoi regime, there were many reports in December that the Peking regime had increased its logistic support of Hanoi by sending more and more technicians and improving road and rail supply lines from China into North Vietnam. All of this implied that the Chinese Communists might soon (if this is not already the case) have committed themselves so far in support of

North Vietnam as to find it just as difficult to stop or pull back as the United States has found it.

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS QUESTIONED

The net effect of this continuing double escalation was to cast very serious doubts on the validity of some basic assumptions underlying the United States military commitment to the Vietnamese war. In the spring of 1965, it was assumed that the gradual increase in United States combat troops in South Vietnam, supported by massive use of airpower, plus "controlled" bombing of installations and supply lines in North Vietnam, would induce the Hanoi regime to agree to a negotiated settlement. It was believed that, at some point, Hanoi would decide that the United States could not be driven out of South Vietnam and that a settlement of the war was more advantageous than suffering more and more attrition. Or, at the very least, it was hoped that a much larger commitment of United States forces plus much heavier concentration of firepower would eventually wear down the Vietcong to the point of near stalemate and finally enable the Saigon government, with American help, to regain control of increasing areas of the countryside.

Commitment of greatly increased American forces to the war appeared to have had the opposite effect. In the closing months of 1965, Hanoi seemed to have hardened its resolve to fight on and to meet force with force. Hanoi's refusal to consider negotiations was supported by Peking. Certainly the Chinese Communists have nothing to gain by a negotiated peace in Vietnam and probably see many advantages in continuing a war which they believe will eventually wear down the American resolve. In December, a series of statements from Soviet leaders appeared to show as much hardening of the Soviet position as that of Hanoi.

Therefore, in 1966, the U.S. government, while continuing publicly to urge a negotiated settlement of the war on the basis of no preconditions, must examine a new set of assumptions about the Vietnam conflict and

the possible conditions under which it might be ended on terms that will not violate basic American objectives of a free and independent South Vietnam.

But the new dimension of the war in Vietnam brought into doubt another assumption underlying American policy. Since 1961, the American government has been fully aware that the Hanoi regime has been using the territory of Laos to develop infiltration routes into the central highlands of South Vietnam and for supply dumps, rest camps and other logistic support. There is also evidence that Cambodian territory close to the South Vietnamese border has been used for the same purposes. With infiltration of growing numbers of the regular North Vietnamese army into South Vietnam, there has been a corresponding increase in logistic support. Until late 1965, it was assumed that it would not become necessary for the United States to take overt armed action within the territory of Laos or Cambodia to reduce or eliminate these sanctuaries. Then, it was a question of how long the United States would be able to refrain from direct attacks on armed concentrations in Laos and Cambodia and the interdiction of supply lines and dumps. Under what circumstances and with what justification would the American government determine that these sanctuaries must no longer be available to the enemy?

Equally important was the continuing question of how strongly the United States should carry its air raids in the North to the Hanoi-Haiphong industrial base and port facilities. Certain segments of American opinion have urged this from the beginning. If American casualties mount and more and more American troops go into combat, these demands for "decisive action" directly against Hanoi can be expected to increase. While it is widely believed in Washington that the President intends to resist these extreme proposals because of the dire possibilities of a full-scale conflict with Communist China and the dangers of nuclear war, these and other proposals will certainly be debated.

With no end of the war in sight in 1965, there was mounting criticism from many

sources that the United States had not explored avenues of negotiation and ways to end the war forcefully and actively enough. The American peace drive early in 1966 may answer this criticism at least in part.

All of the foregoing represents a summary interpretation of some of the problems of the war in Vietnam. There is one other aspect of American policy in this war, however, that requires attention, and this is the problem of the "intent" of the United States towards the North Vietnam regime. President Lyndon Johnson and his aides have made it clear from the beginning of 1965 that the United States "seeks no wider war" and that it is *not* the intention of the United States to destroy North Vietnam and the Hanoi regime of Ho Chi Minh. On the contrary, the President's speech at The Johns Hopkins University on April 7, 1965, envisaged a future for North Vietnam as an independent state, *provided* the Hanoi regime halted its aggression against the South and stopped supporting the Vietcong. After Secretary McNamara returned from Vietnam the last of November, he was reported to have said:

Our political objective is an independent South Vietnam. It is not to destroy Hanoi or Red China. We must make it clear that we don't want to destroy anyone. We must control the application of power to fully support our political objective.

A most difficult question, however, is whether Ho Chi Minh and his associates believe these American statements of policy objectives. And do the leaders in Peking and Moscow also accept such declarations as sincere?

These are not easy questions to answer but whatever answers are found will inevitably affect the future policy of the United States. (This whole matter of course depends to a large extent on whether or not there is an intervening cease-fire.)

As the Hanoi regime evaluates the total United States war effort in Vietnam, at what point will Ho and his colleagues decide that—in spite of all that we say—United States actions actually prove that we, in fact, *are* intent on eventually destroying the North Vietnam regime? If the Hanoi rulers de

reach this conclusion, will they call for massive armed help from Communist China? Again, even if Ho places some credence in American policy statements, there may be others within the Hanoi regime who do not. How much weight will they carry with Ho? And what of Peking? Will there come a time when Mao Tse-tung and his advisers will conclude that they cannot afford to see the North Vietnam government destroyed or seriously weakened, or contemplate the possibility of American and South Vietnamese forces encamped close to their southern borders? Careful analysis of these questions is essential if the United States is to avoid a miscalculation of the intentions of our adversaries.

NONMILITARY PROBLEMS

The political-military problems of policy directly relating to our war in Vietnam are difficult enough. But no survey of United States policy can overlook the many non-military problems confronting the United States, not only in Vietnam, but also in the whole area of Southeast Asia as a result of significant changes during the past ten months. It is important to look at the non-military side of the war in South Vietnam, the "unreported war." Since 1955, the United States has consistently asserted that it was our purpose to assist the Saigon government, not only to fight the Vietcong but, more importantly, to help it restore the countryside to some semblance of social and economic and political stability under Saigon's authority. This still remains a major United States objective. Its success, however, rests on the ability of the Saigon government to carry the main burden of initiative in the countryside and to manage its economic, social and political programs with some degree of effectiveness.

The long, dreary tale of failures in this respect should not obscure the fact that these efforts are still being pressed by South Vietnamese and American officials working together with token technical assistance and economic aid from over 29 other nations of the free world. This slow, hard and often

frustrating work continues day-by-day, often under the most hazardous conditions. Progress is hard to appraise, because reports of this vital but nonmilitary activity are buried in the avalanche of battle reports. But the very fact of the enlargement of the war has changed the dimensions of the civic effort, raising many questions that did not appear important a year ago. A year ago, it was said that we might win battles against the Vietcong but lose the support of the people in the countryside. Now, the struggle to help the Vietnamese peasants in the areas not controlled by the Vietcong has taken on new characteristics.

First, the extent and duration of the war have violently dislocated the economy of South Vietnam, posing new problems for the United States and the Saigon government. Warfare has been almost continuous in Vietnam since 1946. The mass of the people are war-weary. Shifting Vietcong control over large segments of the countryside has prevented consistent and continual development of programs designed to help the mass of the peasants. Continued terrorism and assassination of local officials by the Vietcong have eaten away the effectiveness of many promising efforts to make the daily life of people in the rural areas a little more bearable and a little more secure.

Second, the enlarged war and increased use of American firepower on the ground and from the air in South Vietnam have produced in the past year a major dislocation of population. Until a year ago, the war in South Vietnam was largely a guerrilla war, ebbing and flowing in and around the thousands of villages and hamlets in the countryside. The Vietnamese peasants tried to live with it the best they could, but their aid for the guerrillas or resistance to them gradually began to count for less and less in terms of any kind of decent livelihood or personal safety. Then, six months ago, when the war escalated to a new stage of larger battles and the application of tremendous firepower not confined to one area, but in almost every province of the country, hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese peasants sought the

only way out. They fled the countryside to the larger towns and cities hoping to find a little more personal safety. In early December, it was estimated that there were over 800,000 refugees in towns and cities where United States and South Vietnamese forces seemed strong enough to provide some security from bullets and bombs. Beset by all the other complex problems of total war, the United States and Saigon governments were slow to recognize the seriousness of this refugee problem and have only now begun to carry out systematic programs of relief—feeding, housing and clothing these people.

Sadly enough, this refugee problem is likely to grow much worse before the fighting stops. Five months ago, it was estimated that if the war continued to escalate in numbers of troops involved and firepower used, in another twelve months the refugee population might well reach two million; and if a cease-fire were brought about in a year or a year and a half, the Saigon government and the United States would find over three million displaced people who somehow would have to be fed, clothed, given shelter and, more importantly, resettled somewhere so that they once again could become productive members of a "postwar" Vietnamese society.

A third dislocation produced by the enlarged war is the inevitable economic and social consequences of the increased armies in the field. By December, 1965, there were probably more than 600,000 men under arms on both sides including South Vietnamese, Americans, Vietcong and North Vietnamese. This number could well reach a million before the summer of 1966. The introduction of a United States force planned to exceed 300,000, as recently reported, has meant a tremendous effort to set up the logistic supply bases, new ports along the coast and all the immense paraphernalia a modern army and air force require. The money spent for procurement of local supplies and labor plus the money that the South Vietnamese and American troops spend locally has threatened a runaway inflation which has been another factor inducing peasants to flee to the larger towns and cities. It is also

important to note that this greatly increased war effort—in effect making this a total war as far as the Vietnamese people are concerned—has begun to change the psychology of the South Vietnamese administration and that of the Americans working in nonmilitary capacities in the country. Reports clearly indicate that more and more there is the psychology of a "country-at-war" in which, inevitably, any action that contributes directly to the war effort is "good," and other activities that may have more long-range, and perhaps beneficial, consequences are neglected and hampered. Why build a school or a clinic or initiate local councils if the area is likely to be overrun or bombed out the next day or the next week or the next month? This is not said to detract from the heroic efforts of both South Vietnamese and Americans engaged in civic action programs, but only to assert that an enlarged war and protracted warfare take a mental and psychological toll of human beings as well as its toll of human life.

WIDER REPERCUSSIONS

If most of this survey of United States policy in Southeast Asia has been focused on the Vietnam war, it is only because there is so much at stake in this struggle. In the harsh light of American military involvement in Vietnam, other significant events in the area over the past year seem less important. Nonetheless, it should be obvious that the American effort in Vietnam has had repercussions within the whole of Southeast Asia as well as elsewhere. One has the sense that many governments in this area, as well as in other parts of Asia and in Europe and Africa, are qualifying their relations with the United States because of their concern over the war in Vietnam. Whether it is true, as some observers have noted, that the United States has lost prestige and that American conduct of the war in Vietnam has diminished confidence in the United States may be debatable. Certainly there has been no lessening of anti-American demonstrations from Moscow and London or from the capitals of many Latin American countries.

In Southeast Asia, there is most certainly a growing unease in all countries about the course of the war and a growing anxiety that the conflict might spread to engulf nations other than Vietnam. In one sense, there are ambivalent fears. There is the fear that if the United States does negotiate an end to the Vietnam war, there will be only an uneasy truce until a new outbreak occurs, and there is the fear that next time the United States may not be willing to act decisively. On the other hand, there is the fear that if the United States is substantially successful in its objectives, both Hanoi and the Chinese Communists will attempt to redress what they would consider a setback by taking aggressive action towards Laos, Thailand, or even new fronts in northern Burma or along the Indian border.

Apart from these fears for the future which all peoples share in greater or lesser degree, certain events in the area during 1965 need be noted. It was in his April Johns Hopkins speech that President Johnson announced a proposed billion dollar development bank for Southeast Asia. At the end of November, in Manila, the charter of this new economic aid organ was approved, with Manila as its headquarters. This constructive step provides a substantial underpinning for the huge Mekong Valley development project which has so far proceeded on schedule and, given a return to peaceful conditions in Vietnam, could become the base for more rapid and fruitful economic development involving a better life for millions of people. The fact that both Burma and Indonesia failed to attend the Manila meeting and sign the charter should not be taken as a final rejection of their participation in this undertaking.

Two political changes in Southeast Asia have forced a reassessment of underlying assumptions of American policy. First there was the dramatic series of events in Indonesia revolving around the so-called 30th of September attempted coup d'etat. In early summer, it was generally felt that United States-Indonesian relations had reached about the lowest point possible without a complete severance. It was assumed that the best the

United States could do was to keep a foot in the door. Then, in a quick and very dramatic series of events, the whole picture changed. While the general situation in Indonesia is still clouded and no one can safely predict the future, the United States now has an opportunity to rebuild its relations with that country. This will require patience and time.

This change in the Indonesian political picture has had important repercussions elsewhere, notably in Peking. It marked another in a series of defeats for Communist China's diplomacy occurring in a brief period of five or six months in 1965. First, there was the apparent failure of the Chinese Communists to extend their area of influence among the newer African nations. Then there was the failure of Peking to have its way in managing the so-called "Second Bandung Conference" scheduled for Algiers. After a coup d'etat in Algeria, the conference was postponed and, after a second high-level meeting, it has now been forgotten. Finally, there was the feeble and abortive attempt of Peking at intervention in the "summer war"

(Continued on page 116)

William C. Johnstone taught political science at the George Washington University until 1946. There he also served as dean of the School of Government. He was director of U.S.I.S. for India during 1946-1947 and an adviser to the U.S. diplomatic mission to Nepal in 1947. He served in the Department of State until 1953. During 1957-1959, he was co-director of the Rangoon-Hopkins Center of Southeast Asian studies and visiting professor at the University of Rangoon. He has lectured and traveled extensively in South and Southeast Asia, most recently in 1962. Mr. Johnstone is a lecturer at the Department of State's Foreign Service Institute and a consultant to the RAND Corporation. Author of a number of works on Asian politics, his most recent publication is *Burma's Foreign Policy—A Study in Neutrality* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963).

BOOK REVIEWS

ON ASIA

THE VIET-NAM READER. Articles and Documents on American Foreign Policy and the Viet-Nam Crisis. EDITED BY MARCUS G. RASKIN AND BERNARD B. FALL. (New York: Random House, 1965. 376 pages, chronology, bibliography and index, \$5.95; paperbound, \$2.45.)

This is a timely and comprehensive survey of the issues at stake in Vietnam and the history that led up to the Second Indochina War. Viewpoints of many different shades are included, as are the pertinent documents of the period since 1954. The articles by Bernard Fall, "How the French Got Out of Vietnam" and "Vietnam—the Agonizing Reappraisal" (the latter taken from *Current History's* February, 1965, issue) provide clear background, as do the Geneva Accord texts and the State Department and White House papers and statements. The articles on the Vietnam lobby in the United States and on the various negotiating positions in late 1965 are especially interesting.

T.E.H.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDONESIA. BY JUSTUS M. VAN DER KROEF. (Vancouver, Canada: University of British Columbia Press, 1965. 304 pages, notes and index, \$7.50; paperbound, \$5.50.)

In this thoroughly documented history of the Communist Party of Indonesia, Justus M. van der Kroef clarifies many of the intricate and tortuous relationships which the P.K.I. has followed in its evolution from its nadir in the pre-World War II era through its dormant phase after the disastrous Madiun uprising to its peak of Party strength in 1963.

Much of the subject matter covered in this volume adds significantly to the field of Asian political studies—particularly the discussions of Party organization and front

groups which are the capillaries of the Communist movement.

Various chapters deal with such topics as the Indonesian army, the Muslim nationalist organizations, and the puzzling yet dynamic personality of President Sukarno. The most valuable parts of these essays deal with the complicated facets of P.K.I. orientation—vis-a-vis Peking's policies of assisting like-minded groups in Southeast Asia.

René Peritz

University of Pennsylvania

THE LAST OF THE MANDARINS: DIEM OF VIETNAM. BY ANTHONY T. BOUSCAREN. (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 1965. 174 pages, \$3.95.)

An admirer of Diem presents a strongly sympathetic account of late President Ngo Dinh Diem's career. The American press corps and the State Department are blamed for the downfall of Diem, which the author argues was responsible for the "downfall turn" in the Vietnamese situation.

Chong-Sik Lee

University of Pennsylvania

THE HONORABLE CONQUERORS: THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN 1945-1952. BY WALT SHELDON. (New York: Macmillan, 1965. 322 pages and index, \$6.95.)

A leisurely ramble through the thicket of postwar Pacific policies is the chief merit of this account of the strange American interlude in the affairs of Japan. Pleasantly informal in style and presentation, Walt Sheldon, an official attached to the Armed Forces and TV networks, reconstructs many of the colorful and dramatic events of the strange confrontation of two peoples—ostensibly in mortal combat with the other and yet uncertain as to the final intention of the other.

R.P.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

Final Declaration at Geneva, 1954

At the Geneva Conference of 1954, a series of agreements were reached ending the warfare in Indochina. At the close of the conference, a Final Declaration was made public by the conferees. The United States did not join in the declaration, and the State of Vietnam, which had not signed the agreements, protested the partition of Vietnam provided for at Geneva. The complete text of the Final Declaration follows:

FINAL DECLARATION,¹ dated the 21st July, 1954, of the Geneva Conference on the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China, in which the representatives of Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, France, Laos, the People's Republic of China, the State of Viet-Nam, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America took part.

1. The Conference takes note of the agreements ending hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam and organizing international control and the supervision of the execution of the provisions of these agreements.

2. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the ending of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam; the Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreements on the cessation of hostilities will permit Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam henceforth to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations.

3. The Conference takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cam-

bodia and of Laos of their intention to adopt measures permitting all citizens to take their place in the national community, in particular by participating in the next general elections, which, in conformity with the constitution of each of these countries, shall take place in the course of the year 1955, by secret ballot and in conditions of respect for fundamental freedoms.

4. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam prohibiting the introduction into Viet-Nam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions. The Conference also takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos of their resolution not to request foreign aid whether in war material, in personnel or in instructors except for the purpose of the effective defence of their territory and, in the case of Laos, to the extent defined by the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Laos.

5. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam to the effect that no military base under the control of a foreign state may be established in the regrouping zones of the two parties,² the latter having the obligation to see that the zones allotted to them shall not constitute part of any military alliance and shall not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. The Conference also

¹ Geneva Conference doc. IC/43/Rev. 2; reprinted in *Report on Indochina: Report of Senator Mike Mansfield on a Study Mission to Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos*, Oct. 15, 1954 (Senate Foreign Relations Committee print, 83d Cong., 2d sess.), p. 26-27. This was an unsigned Declaration.

² The "two parties" being France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North). The French-sponsored State of Vietnam (South) was not a signatory to the agreement on the cessation of hostilities.

takes note of the declarations of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to the effect that they will not join in any agreement with other States if this agreement includes the obligation to participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or, in the case of Laos, with the principles of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos or, so long as their security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian or Laotian territory for the military forces of foreign Powers.

6. The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Viet-Nam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary. The Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates the necessary basis for the achievement in the near future of a political settlement in Viet-Nam.

7. The Conference declares that, so far as Viet-Nam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the Viet-Nameese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the Member States of the International Supervisory Commission,³ referred to in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from 20 July 1955 onwards.

³ The member states are Canada, India and Poland.

8. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities intended to ensure the protection of individuals and of property must be most strictly applied and must, in particular, allow everyone in Viet-Nam to decide freely in which zone he wishes to live.

9. The competent representative authorities of the Northern and Southern zones of Viet-Nam, as well as the authorities of Laos and Cambodia, must not permit any individual or collective reprisals against persons who have collaborated in any way with one of the parties during the war, or against members of such persons' families.

10. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the Government of the French Republic to the effect that it is ready to withdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, at the request of the government concerned and within periods which shall be fixed by agreement between the parties except in the cases where, by agreement between the two parties, a certain number of French troops shall remain at specified points and for a specified time.

11. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government to the effect that for the settlement of all the problems connected with the re-establishment and consolidation of peace in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, the French Government will proceed from the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam.

12. In their relations with Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam, each member of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of the abovementioned states, and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

13. The members of the Conference agree to consult one another on any question which may be referred to them by the International Supervisory Commission, in order to study such measures as may prove necessary to ensure that the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam are respected.

VIETNAM: LAND AND PEOPLE

(Continued from page 70)

Huế, 50 miles south of the dividing border between North and South Vietnam, is the old imperial capital, with the former royal palace. Among the other cities along the coast is Danang (formerly Tourane), with a beautiful harbor and fairly adequate harbor facilities, but exposed to the winds from the northeast, and Nhatrong, close to Camranh Bay.

Haiphong, the harbor of Tonkin, has grown into a large city: the latest figure (1960) gives its population as about 400,000. It is 10 miles inland and is connected with the sea by way of a narrow channel, which has silting difficulties.

If peace returns, Vietnam will still face the future with too many people and not enough arable land. Probably more people can live in the mountains and more people will move into the Mekong delta, but Vietnam will not be a rich country because minerals are scarce. The chief assets are the Annamites themselves, who more than deserve a life without war.

MILITARY POLICY

(Continued from page 97)

deceptive maps. When Hop Tac was still in vogue last year, the briefing officer excused the bombing of the embassy—well within the “secure” area—by pointing out that John F. Kennedy was assassinated in downtown Dallas. Even the all-American military enclaves being constructed along the coast and at some inland points are subject to sabotage, infiltration and mortar attack.

From the American point of view, the risks for the future are substantial. Chinese entry is, of course, a possibility, perhaps one that has been underestimated. Deeper Soviet involvement may also lie ahead: Administration officials take seriously the warnings from European Communist sources that continued attacks against North Vietnam make

it increasingly difficult for the Soviet Union to stay aloof from a war in which the Communist interests are Chinese rather than Soviet but in which a fellow socialist state is under attack.

The most serious military problem facing the United States in South Vietnam is really political rather than military. It is how to win the support of the people of South Vietnam. The immediate problem is how to persuade them to stop giving food, shelter, recruits and intelligence to the Vietcong and to turn their allegiance to Saigon.

If they cannot be persuaded to do so, and if the United States gives up the attempt to persuade them to do so, that failure will be strong evidence that the conflict still has elements of a revolutionary civil war, despite massive intervention by North Vietnam on one side and the United States on the other.

THE FRENCH RÉGIME

(Continued from page 78)

reunited to Vietnam. The Bao Dai regime was formally recognized as the government of Vietnam by several score outside states, but it attracted little or no following within Vietnam.

The several score decades of French rule in Vietnam meant much to the economic development of the country, but they made relatively little contribution to the solution of the eventual postwar problems of unification and self-government. French-ruled Cochinchina gained virtually no experience either in self-government or in economic control at any level. By the time of the French defeat and withdrawal in 1954, traditional imperial and mandarin authority were completely discredited in Tonkin and Annam. The fairly large Catholic community, north and south, was politically and culturally alienated, as were several other competing religious sects in Cochinchina and, during the course of the eight years of the independence struggle—1946 to 1954—the leadership of the nationalist cause was largely captured by a Communist minority.

THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS

(Continued from page 84)

lished the Republic of Vietnam on October 26, 1955. Within a year he promulgated his own constitution which was a declaration of independence.

At the same time, Ho Chi Minh moved to establish his Fatherland Front of Vietnam on September 10, 1955; it was designed to unite the entire Vietnamese population. The tasks of the Front were:

- (1) to continue to struggle for a thorough implementation of the Geneva Agreement, for the consolidation of peace and achievement of unity;
- (2) to do their utmost to consolidate the North in every respect and concurrently to keep up and intensify the patriotic movement in the South; and
- (3) to do their utmost to broaden and consolidate the National United Front all over the country.

This platform was approved at the fifth session of the National Assembly in Hanoi, September 14-20, 1955.¹⁵ Murti sadly concluded that "It was evident that the civil administrations in the North and South . . . arrogated to themselves all the attributes of sovereign states."

The July 20, 1956, deadline expired without any arrangements for elections. North Vietnam and the Soviet Union protested this violation of the Geneva accords. South Vietnam and the United States charged that the agreements had already been violated by a North Vietnamese buildup of men and arms. The Geneva accords had stipulated that no new troops, weapons and military bases should be introduced. They had also provided that "the two parties shall ensure that the zones assigned to them do not adhere to any military alliance. . . ."

Did the states meeting at Geneva in 1954 secure what they wanted from the Geneva Agreements? Great Britain was successful in avoiding serious involvement. France succeeded in disengaging herself. Cambodia

continued to be independent and spunky and today is perhaps the only state in the area that obtained most of what she hoped for at Geneva. Laos is too complicated for a short comment. Communist China, the Soviet Union and North Vietnam have failed to consolidate Vietnam as a Communist state, which they fully expected to do.

South Vietnam and the United States have continued to disassociate themselves from the Geneva accords and to oppose North Vietnam's drive to absorb South Vietnam. A return to the Geneva Agreements in 1966, if that were possible, would be as unproductive a solution of the problems besetting the Two Vietnams as the agreements were in 1954.

U.S. POLICY IN S.E. ASIA

(Continued from page 111)

between India and Pakistan which came to naught except to make the Chinese Communists appear to be a "paper tiger." It is possible that this series of political defeats for Peking has contributed greatly to the Chinese Communists' intransigent position on the Vietnam war and may, in turn, have infected Hanoi as well.

The other political event, but without so many international overtones, was the sudden separation of Singapore from the Federation of Malaysia in August. Singapore has become a new city-state in the world community and has appealed to the United States and other Western nations for economic assistance. The American government will have to decide how to restructure its diplomacy and its aid policies so as not to lose ground with either the Singapore government or the remaining Malaysia Federation.

As the year 1965 drew to a close, it was predictable that the war in Vietnam would not only consume the close attention of the Johnson administration but that it would gain the attention of larger and larger numbers of Americans of all shades of opinion. This will be reflected in the 1966 sessions of Congress in Washington and in the American

¹⁵ Murti, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

and the world press. The fact that the war seemed to have escalated almost to the scope of another Korea and the refusal, when this was written, of Hanoi to consider any kind of talks or negotiations will lead to many doubts as to where the war will end.

All this leads to a final problem or dilemma for future American policy in Southeast Asia. With our present commitment towards Vietnam and our involvement with Thailand and with the future status of Laos and Cambodia, where will the United States be when the fighting stops, as it must sometime? Will the United States have incurred such large-scale commitments in this part of Southeast Asia as to make it impossible for us to avoid the involved and complex tasks of political, social and economic reconstruction? And, if so, how can we manage this without acting like (or, in fact, becoming) an imperial power in this part of the world? These complexities and dilemmas of American policy in Southeast Asia seem likely to present the toughest policy problem confronting the Johnson administration in the year ahead. For on their solution may well rest the success or failure of the United States policy towards Asia for years to come.

VIETNAM: THE NEW KOREA

(Continued from page 90)

President Diem had gone to the trouble of constructing a facade of democracy to placate the United States, whose aid was indispensable to him.¹²

And that is perhaps the Diem regime's best epitaph for almost ten years of misrule: it had

¹² Marguerite Higgins, *Our Vietnam Nightmare* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 170.

¹³ According to *Tu-Do* (a Saigon newspaper) of February 28, 1959, the Saigon regime had arrested a total 39,909 "former communist cadres, . . . and sympathizers" in the preceding six-month period. The population of the province amounted to about 270,000.

¹⁴ It took the overthrow of Diem in November, 1963, to get the Hoa Hao battalions to return to the fold of the Saigon government. The Hoa Hao sect now again controls the administration of three Mekong Delta provinces, which are the most peaceful of all of South Vietnam.

¹⁵ "South Viet-Nam's Internal Problems," *Pacific Affairs*, September, 1958.

"taken the trouble" to construct a democratic facade for the United States, but it had somehow never provided even a modicum of its reality to the South Vietnamese.

All this, the stay-behind guerrillas watched with growing interest. But, interestingly enough, the initial armed resistance against Diem came from resolutely *anti-Communist* sect elements: four battalions of about 350–400 men each of the Hoa Hao faith which refused to surrender after their chief, Ba-Cut, was taken prisoner by Diem's forces and guillotined during a truce. In the ensuing repression directed against ex-Vietminh elements who had returned to their villages,¹³ many of the latter in turn went into hiding, sometimes collaborating with the Hoa Hao,¹⁴ and sometimes forming separate *maquis*. Faced with physical extermination, the ex-Vietminh elements had little choice but to face up to a second round of fighting, regardless of Hanoi's plans.

AS SEEN FROM HANOI

Indeed, the Department of State's White Book of February, 1965, fully agrees with the North Vietnamese view (in fact, it uses it as "proof" of North Vietnam's aggression against South Vietnam) that the first statements dealing with support of a resistance movement in the South were made at the third Lao-Dong (Workers'—i.e., Communist) Party Congress in Hanoi in September, 1960. But neither North Vietnam nor the State Department explain the existence of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam in the years from 1956 to 1960. That such guerrilla warfare indeed existed can be fully documented from South Vietnamese sources and was in fact so documented by this writer as early as 1958.¹⁵ Here again irresponsible, across-the-board repression did the rest. On May 6, 1959, the Diem regime passed Law 10/59, which provided for a system of drumhead courts capable of handing out death sentences for even trivial offenses. Thus *all* South Vietnamese opposition—whether Communist or not—had to become subversive, and did. The South Vietnamese army resorted to putsches and coups (the first in November, 1960, even

before the Vietcong got started); the Hoa-Hao stayed in the *maquis*; and the Communists' turn also came. In a recently published book, the noted French Asian specialist, Jean Lacouture, describes the situation prevailing in 1959–1960 in a few apt phrases:

... new legislation was promulgated in Saigon that opened the great period of the "witch hunt"; four persons out of five became suspects and liable to be imprisoned if not executed. War generally entails extraordinary legislation; one can say that here extraordinary legislation entailed war. At that time Marxist organizations hardly took the lead. But, taken by the throat, they counterattacked.¹⁶

The same view of events was described earlier by Philippe Devillers as he portrayed the mood prevailing among the Vietminh cadres in the south of Vietnam in 1959:

... The overriding needs of the world-wide strategy of the Socialist camp meant little or nothing to guerrilla fighters being hunted down in [South Vietnam]. It was in such a climate of feeling that, in 1959, responsible elements of the Communist resistance ... came to the conclusion that they had to act, whether Hanoi wanted them to or not. ... Hanoi preferred diplomatic notes, but it was to find that its hand had been forced.¹⁷

In March, 1960, a meeting took place somewhere in the depths of the South Vietnamese jungle, organized by a group that called itself "The South Vietnam Veterans of the Resistance Association," which launched a call for resistance against the Diem regime. And on April 26 of the same year, a group of highly respectable South Vietnamese Catholic and Buddhist leaders (including several who would in 1964–1966 become ministers in the Saigon government) issued a proclamation to Diem, warning him of impending disaster. Neither of the two voices received the slightest hearing in Saigon's official circles, let alone in Washington.

But to Hanoi, the warning could only mean

one thing—that the South Vietnamese government was simply and purely disintegrating under its own lack of support. In the typically conservative fashion of Communist regimes subsequent to the Greek and Filipino disappointments, Hanoi still hesitated to commit itself to the side of the guerrillas. Finally, on September 5, 1960, at the Hanoi party congress, Lê Duan, the Lao-Dong's party secretary and a former southern guerrilla leader himself, took official cognizance in his report of the "southern People's revolutionary struggle" and advocated the creation of a "broad national united front against the U.S.-Diem clique." Again, there was no automatic response from the southern guerrillas. But not long afterwards, on November 11, 1960, the elite paratroop brigade of the South Vietnamese army rebelled against Diem and had to be put down with tanks. Most of its leaders fled or were imprisoned, and another wave of mass arrests began throughout South Vietnam. Five weeks later, on December 20, 1960, the "National Liberation Front of South Vietnam" (N.L.F.S.V.) was proclaimed, and the Second Indochina War was under way.

Internally, by 1960 North Vietnam had succeeded in weathering the worst of what had been a botched land reform and had succeeded in building up a modicum of medium-sized industries. If a comparison with advanced European countries may be permitted, North Vietnam could expect to become, not a second Japan, but perhaps a second Belgium. It began to embark upon an ambitious Five-Year Plan—it was the latter that was the main topic of the third Party Conference, and not the creation of the N.L.F.S.V.—whose targets it failed to reach but which nevertheless brought living standards up to a somewhat higher level than is usually realized. They are, however, lower than those of South Vietnam.¹⁸ In the field of industrial development, progress up to the beginning of round-the-clock American air raids on February 7, 1965, was notable, thanks in large part to Soviet bloc and Chinese economic aid, whose total is estimated at over \$1.3 billion.

¹⁶ Jean Lacouture, *Vietnam: Between Two Truces* (New York: Random House, 1966).

¹⁷ Philippe Devillers, "The Struggle for the Unification of Vietnam," in P. J. Honey, ed., *North Vietnam Today* (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 38.

¹⁸ Fall, "North Viet-Nam: A Profile," in *Problems of Communism*, July–August, 1965.

In terms of politics, Hanoi was to feel increasingly the effect of the conflicting pulls of Moscow and Peking. The solid leadership of Ho Chi Minh successfully avoided a direct North Vietnamese commitment to either side in the dispute, although doubtless the increasing pace of the Second Indochina War made it at first appear that Hanoi would entirely rely on Peking. As it turned out, however (and, apparently, this is still the case), Peking was unwilling at first to commit its own power in a renewed confrontation along Korean lines with the United States in the absence of a Soviet commitment of full support.

Peking, furthermore, worked to prevent the Soviet Union from supporting North Vietnam in a decisive manner out of a fear, openly expressed by Chou En-lai prior to the abortive Algiers Afro-Asian Conference, that the Soviet Union would use her military leverage in North Vietnam for the purpose of compelling Hanoi to accept a compromise settlement with the United States—just as she had used her leverage on Cuba during the missile crisis of 1962. There is strong second-hand evidence¹⁹ that the Soviet Union (at least in the spring of 1965) indeed did attempt to influence Hanoi in favor of a compromise settlement with South Vietnam and the United States; and that Hanoi—between late 1964 and May, 1965—had made some attempts at making preliminary contacts with the United States.²⁰ The total failure of those alleged contacts still awaits full historical examination, but there can be little doubt that various miscues on both sides have now resulted in a climate of suspicion that have made further attempts at direct contacts between the major adversaries extremely difficult.

THE OUTLOOK

This leaves the Soviet Union in an extremely awkward position: it has become axiomatic in Washington that the U.S.S.R.

¹⁹ Edward Crankshaw, "Peking Pushes Moscow to the Brink," *The Observer*, London, 14 November, 1965.

²⁰ Fall, "The Year of the Hawks," in *The New York Times Magazine*, December 12, 1965.

prizes her good relations with the West in general and the United States in particular, above all, and will go to any lengths to preserve them. It also seems to be considered as axiomatic that the relations between Red China and the U.S.S.R. have gone beyond the point of no return. Any attempt on the part of the Soviet Union to provide effective help to North Vietnam (let alone to the Vietcong inside South Vietnam) must bring in its wake a dramatic worsening of American-Soviet relations on a worldwide scale, with all that such a situation entails.

The U.S.S.R. can, of course—in fact, Washington expects this—completely wash her hands of the Vietnamese affair, both in her role as the leader of the Communist orbit and as a cochairman of the 1954 Geneva Agreements, and let American technology reduce both Vietnams to rubble before reconstructing them under President Lyndon Johnson's Johns Hopkins speech program. Such an outlook on the Vietnam situation surely is more optimistic than the facts warrant. The Soviet Union has remained aloof from the Indochina area since the Laotian Agreements of 1962, but there are some very strong indications that this period of aloofness may well be at an end.

As for the American view, it curiously, if unconsciously, resembles the American view of Korea in September, 1950, in that very strange phase of relative stability after General Douglas MacArthur's Inchon landing had cleared South Korea of invaders, but before the Chinese "People's Volunteers" transformed the Korean War into the bloody three-year stalemate it later became. At that time also, as the authors of the *U.S. Air Force in Korea* point out in a chapter aptly called "Toward An Air-Pressure Strategy," it was advocated that a "massive strike" against the northern capital would cause the "tottering government" there "to listen more attentively to United Nations terms for ending the war." A later chapter is titled "Irrigation Dam Attacks Speed Truce Negotiations."

Both chapters may well have been replayed in Vietnam by the time these pages are read.

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of December, 1965, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

The Month in Review

By MARY KATHARINE HAMMOND

Instructor, Department of History, Ohio Northern University

INTERNATIONAL

Berlin

Dec. 18—The Berlin Wall is opened to West Berliners by East Germany for Christmas reunions with relatives in East Berlin. Almost a million permits for visits between today and January 2 are issued.

Dec. 26—A young West German is killed by East German border guards while helping two East Germans to escape. The American, British and French commanders in Berlin condemn the shooting.

Organization of African Unity

Dec. 3—The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in Addis Ababa, vote unanimously for the 36 member nations to sever diplomatic relations with Britain December 15 unless Britain has crushed the Rhodesian rebellion. The conference also votes that its members impose a complete economic blockade on Rhodesia.

Dec. 5—The ministers are reported to have instructed a five-nation O.A.U. committee to draw plans for sabotage and military action against Rhodesia.

Dec. 21—To date, nine members of the O.A.U.—Algeria, the Congo Republic (Brazzaville), Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, the Sudan, Tanzania and the United Arab Republic—have broken diplomatic relations with Britain.

United Nations

Dec. 10—The 1965 Nobel Peace Prize is presented in Oslo to the United Nations Children's Fund.

Argentina, Bulgaria, New Zealand, Mali, Japan, Nigeria and Uganda are elected to non-permanent seats on the newly expanded Security Council.

Dec. 13—Addressing the General Assembly, Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan offers India a pledge of peace in return for self-determination for Kashmir.

Dec. 15—The General Assembly approves a three-year extension of the aid program for Palestinian Arab refugees.

Dec. 16—Britain's Prime Minister Harold Wilson, addressing the General Assembly, asks that the U.N. support "to the hilt" Britain's economic and financial sanctions against Rhodesia. He insists that military force, urged by many African nations, should be rejected. The delegations of 24 African nations walk out before the prime minister speaks.

Dec. 20—The General Assembly rules that a simple majority, rather than the former two-thirds majority, is enough to adopt a resolution calling for the removal of foreign bases from dependent areas.

By a vote of 100 to 0, the Political Committee adopts a resolution condemning all forms of intervention in other states, including subversion and terrorism.

Dec. 21—The twentieth session of the General Assembly ends. On its last day, the Assembly approves a treaty to eliminate racial discrimination which will become effective when 27 nations have ratified it. The Assembly also adopts a record 1966 budget of \$121.5 million.

ARGENTINA

Dec. 5—Argentina and Chile sign an agreement intended to avoid possible military action over a disputed border area in the Laguna del Desierto region.

Dec. 11—Following the arrival yesterday of the first Argentine expedition at the South Pole, the foreign ministry reasserts Argentina's claims in Antarctica.

BRAZIL

Dec. 5—Francisco Negrão, the opposition Social Democrat-Labor candidate, is installed as governor of the State of Guanabara, which includes the city of Rio de Janeiro. President Humberto Castillo Branco has staked his political prestige on his assurance that all elected governors will take office even if they oppose his regime.

Dec. 10—The Supreme Military Court unanimously rejects an order by an army colonel investigating Communist activities for the arrest of Governor Negrão.

Dec. 16—A major effort begins throughout the country to register all rural landholdings for the start of a national agrarian reform program.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

(See the individual countries listed in alphabetical order.)

CAMBODIA

Dec. 26—The government announces that its armed forces will repel any attacks on Cambodian territory from South Vietnam, and any other violation of her frontiers.

Dec. 27—Prince Norodom Sihanouk denies that North Vietnam and the Vietcong are using Cambodia to filter supplies into South Vietnam. He charges that the U.S. is planning a "*coup de force*" against his country.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

(See also *India*.)

Dec. 1—The Foreign Ministry declares that Peking "will certainly not take part" in the world disarmament conference proposed by the U.N.

The Peking radio accuses President Sukarno and the Indonesian army of arresting and "persecuting" Chinese nationals.

Dec. 3—Asian sources disclose that China is demanding and receiving transit-fee payments in dollars from the U.S.S.R. for shipping military aid and medical supplies to North Vietnam.

Dec. 5—Chinese and North Vietnam representatives sign a loan agreement and a "protocol on mutual supply of commodities

and payments for 1966." The amounts are not made public.

Dec. 15—The government disputes an Indian assertion that 30 Chinese troops were killed in a December 12 clash with Indian forces on the Sikkim border.

Dec. 18—The latest issue of *Youth Fortnightly* warns Chinese youth to be prepared to face combined U.S. and Soviet nuclear attacks and the occupation of Chinese territory by "imperialists."

Dec. 20—Chou En-lai declares it is possible that the U.S. will extend the war in Vietnam to all of Indochina and to China.

Dec. 24—A leading Chinese official says China will never wish to join the U.N. so long as it remains under "U.S. domination."

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

Dec. 1—General Joseph D. Mobutu assumes the power to rule the country by decree. The official announcement says his decrees will have the force of law unless parliament votes to reverse them.

Dec. 4—Former President Joseph Kasavubu is allowed to leave the military camp where he was detained after the November 25 coup.

Dec. 22—An agreement is signed in Leopoldville between U.S. and Congo officials for a \$1 million U.S. loan for improved water systems and road construction.

CUBA

(See *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Dec. 22—The Communist Party issues a 19,000-word document denouncing itself for having made disastrous economic mistakes. It says these mistakes have cost the country billions of crowns (7.2 crowns to the dollar). The Central Committee opens a campaign to institute a freer market economy.

DAHOMEY

Dec. 22—General Christophe Soglo takes over as chief-of-state because of "internal political dissension" among three rival factions.

Dec. 26—General Soglo announces that free elections will be held January 16. But he warns he will not hand over power to elected leaders until "order is completely reestablished."

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, THE

Dec. 19—Fighting erupts between government forces and former rebel fighters following a reported attempt to assassinate Colonel Francisco Caamaño, the rebel leader during the summer rebellion.

Dec. 23—Colonel Caamaño warns that the Dominican people are "very, very close" to the end of their patience and will no longer tolerate aggression by government troops. In the continuous fighting since government troops with tanks and machine guns attacked a hotel where former rebel leaders were staying, at least 20 lives have been lost.

FRANCE

Dec. 5—General Charles de Gaulle fails to win a majority of the votes in today's presidential election. The General receives 43.9 per cent, while his major opponent, François Mitterrand, receives 32 per cent.

Dec. 19—In a run-off election for the presidency, de Gaulle receives 55 per cent of the votes.

Dec. 22—Following the first post-election session of President de Gaulle's cabinet, the government notifies its Common Market partners that France is willing to discuss the issues that divide them.

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

Dec. 3—Dr. Erich Apel, chairman of East Germany's Economic Planning Commission, commits suicide.

Dec. 16—Four East German scientists send an appeal to President Johnson not to hand over nuclear weapons to West Germany.

Walter Ulbricht, in a major policy address, orders a streamlining of the country's economy and pledges improvements in the workers' standard of living.

Dec. 21—Two Americans are convicted in a secret trial at Potsdam on charges of having helped East Germans to flee to the

West. They are sentenced to eight years at hard labor.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

(See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

Dec. 2—The Bundestag ends a four-day debate on Chancellor Ludwig Erhard's demand that West Germany participate in a joint nuclear force. The debate shows that only the Chancellor's party, the Christian Democratic Union, supports this demand, while the Christian Social Union and the Free Democrats withhold support.

Dec. 19—Chancellor Erhard leaves for Washington talks with President Johnson.

GREAT BRITAIN (See *United Kingdom*.)

GREECE

(See also *The Vatican*.)

Dec. 9—Archbishop Chrysostomos, the Greek Primate, criticizes Patriarch Athenagoras I for having voided the excommunication cast on the Bishop of Rome in 1054. He reports to the Holy Synod (the 12-bishop church executive) that the Patriarch's action is invalid since all major decisions must be approved by the council of the world's 14 Orthodox churches.

Dec. 15—In a special session the Orthodox Church refuses to accept changes in the church proposed by the government.

Dec. 16—A Greek shipowner announces he has commissioned the Soviet Union to build a \$105 million merchant fleet of 33 ships for his company.

INDIA

(See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

Dec. 14—Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri says he is worried about the construction of Chinese airfields and barracks on the northern border but is opposed to any alliance to deal with the problem.

Dec. 17—The minister of food and agriculture leaves for the U.S. to confer with officials on steps to meet an acute food crisis.

Dec. 28—The Planning Commission reveals that India will cut \$300 million from anticipated spending in the first year of the

new five-year plan as a result of the dislocations caused by the recent war with Pakistan.

Dec. 29—Police fire on strikers at the Tarapur Atomic Power Project, killing 7 and injuring 70.

Dec. 31—Finance Minister T. T. Krishnamachari resigns; Sachindra Chaudhuri is named to succeed him. Charges of corruption leveled against Krishnamachari by the Opposition in November have not been cleared.

INDONESIA

Dec. 5—The ministry of information reports that 46 out of 163 newspapers are banned on charges of Communist affiliation or for failure to comply with new press laws.

Dec. 7—President Sukarno tells 600 committee leaders of the People's Consultative Assembly that, if they don't like his leadership, they can discharge him. He admits the economic failures of his regime but defends his role in safeguarding the revolutionary aims of the nation.

Dec. 14—Defense Minister Abdul Haris Nasution is appointed to the Supreme Operational Command which will rule as an executive body directly under the president. Named with him in the triumvirate are Sultan Hamengku Buwono and Minister of Information Ruslan Abdulgani. First Deputy Premier Foreign Minister Subandrio is eliminated from his former post as commander of the Operational Command.

ISRAEL

Dec. 28—Golda Meir advises a committee of the Knesset that she is retiring after 10 years as foreign minister.

ITALY

(See also *U.S. Foreign Policy and South Vietnam.*)

Dec. 28—Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani resigns as foreign minister. The action follows publication of what he terms "unjust and unfounded" comments on Italian and foreign leaders by his friend, Professor Giorgio La Pira, who was the recent bearer of supposed peace feelers from North Vietnam.

LAOS

Dec. 24—Prince Souvanna Phouma says he is opposed to the entry of U.S. ground forces into Laos to halt North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam. At the same time, Laos welcomes a British report accusing North Vietnam of military action in Laos in violation of the 1962 Geneva accords.

PHILIPPINES, THE

Dec. 30—Ferdinand E. Marcos becomes the sixth president of the Philippines. He pledges his nation to austerity at home and greater cooperation with the free nations of Asia.

RHODESIA

(See also *Intl. O.A.U., Great Britain and Zambia.*)

Dec. 3—Great Britain seizes control of the Rhodesian Reserve Bank, thus cutting off the Rhodesian government from foreign reserves in London valued at \$25 million.

Dec. 4—Prime Minister Ian Smith says Rhodesia will not be able to honor some of its international debts because of British trade and financial sanctions.

Dec. 8—Rhodesian exporters are forbidden to accept British currency for goods sold to neighboring Zambia and Malawi.

Dec. 17—Swiss banks announce the freezing of Rhodesian assets.

Dec. 18—Responding to yesterday's British oil embargo, Rhodesia bars all shipments of oil supplies to Zambia.

Dec. 24—British Governor Sir Humphrey Gibbs tells Rhodesians he is still in charge of the country despite Prime Minister Smith's declaration of independence.

Dec. 28—The government rations gasoline and diesel fuel following Britain's oil embargo.

SYRIA

Dec. 21—The government of Premier Yussef Zayen resigns.

Dec. 24—The reorganized leadership of the Baath Party asks Salah el-Bitar, a former premier and Baathist moderate, to form a new government.

U.S.S.R., THE

Dec. 2—British Foreign Secretary Michael

Stewart confers in Moscow with Soviet officials on the Vietnam situation. He appears before a Soviet television audience to urge the convening of an immediate peace conference.

Dec. 3—The U.S.S.R. launches a rocket, Luna 8, in its fourth attempt at a "soft landing" on the moon.

British Foreign Secretary Stewart ends four days of Moscow conferences. The joint communiqué suggests no agreement on a Vietnam settlement or on disarmament.

Dec. 6—In an interview with a *New York Times* correspondent, Premier Aleksei Kosygin makes his strongest attack on the U.S. since he took office over a year ago. He accuses the U.S. of whipping up a military psychosis and forcing the U.S.S.R. to increase its military budget by 5 per cent.

Dec. 7—*Tass*, the official Soviet press agency, reports that Luna 8 failed in its mission.

Finance Minister V.F. Garbuzov presents a record state budget of 105.4 billion rubles, with 13.4 billion for the military.

Dec. 8—Thousands of "workers' and citizens' representatives" demonstrate in Moscow against U.S. Vietnam policies.

Dec. 9—Anastas Mikoyan resigns as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. He is succeeded by Nikolai V. Podgorny.

Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko warns there can be no East-West disarmament agreement if the West shares nuclear weapons with West Germany.

Dec. 14—The government announces that on December 16 it will start a six-month test in the Pacific "of a variant of a system of landing space vehicles."

Dec. 26—In a joint Soviet-Zambian communiqué, the U.S.S.R. pledges to cooperate with African nations "in providing the utmost assistance to the people of Rhodesia" in their struggle against the white minority government.

Dec. 28—*Tass* announces that a high-level delegation will visit Hanoi shortly. It will be headed by A. N. Shelepin, a senior Communist Party official.

Dec. 31—A curfew bars unescorted school-

children under 16 from Moscow streets after 10 p.m. during the New Year's school vacation, and after 9 p.m. when schools are in session.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Dec. 4—The government announces price increases on a broad range of essential and luxury items. As a countermeasure, the National Assembly is asked by Premier Zakaria Mohieddin for higher income and defense taxes and increases on customs duties.

Dec. 14—The National Assembly calls on the government to hold the line on prices, reduce its spending, make an immediate start on a birth control program and start reporting the truth about the results of the first five-year plan.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *Intl.*, *O.A.U.*, *U.N.*; *Rhodesia* and *Zambia*.)

Dec. 1—Prime Minister Harold Wilson announces the sending of a Royal Air Force squadron with ground protection to Zambia. He says Britain is prepared to send troops into Rhodesia if necessary to protect the Kariba Dam. New economic measures are imposed on Rhodesia. Virtually all imports from there are banned, and no pensions, dividends or interest may be paid from Britain to anyone in Rhodesia.

Dec. 10—The prime minister declares his government will not negotiate with the present Rhodesian leaders because they cannot be trusted.

Dec. 14—Britain and Ireland agree to establish a free-trade area by a staged reduction of tariffs over the next 10 years.

Dec. 17—Britain imposes an oil embargo on Rhodesia.

Dec. 22—The first cabinet changes since Wilson took office 14 months ago are announced. Roy Jenkins, minister of aviation, becomes home secretary, and Fred Mulley is named the new aviation minister.

Dec. 30—The Colonial Office issues a White Paper proposing a new constitutional status for the Crown colonies of Antigua, St.

Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. Under this proposal these east Caribbean islands would become self-governing internally, could amend their own constitutions, and could end their association with Britain at any time.

UNITED STATES, THE

Civil Rights

Dec. 1—A federal court in New Orleans orders Ku Klux Klansmen to stop “acts of terror and intimidation” in Bogalusa, Louisiana.

Dec. 2—Hubert Strange, a segregationist, is sentenced to 10 years in prison by an all-white jury in Anniston, Alabama, for the night-riding slaying of a Negro foundry worker.

Dec. 3—A three-month boycott of white merchants by Negroes ends with an agreement under which the Natchez, Mississippi, government and many major businessmen will grant Negroes a larger voice in city affairs.

In Montgomery, Alabama, an all-white federal jury convicts three Ku Klux Klan members of conspiracy charges resulting from the civil rights slaying of Mrs. Viola Liuzzo.

Dec. 4—The Commission on Civil Rights reports to the President and Congress on the effectiveness of the 1965 Civil Rights Act. It recommends the appointment of more federal voting examiners in the South and asks for positive federal programs to encourage Negro registration.

Dec. 6—The special commission headed by John McCone, appointed to investigate the Los Angeles Watts riots in August, makes extensive recommendations. It warns that much more violent outbreaks will occur unless massive retraining and other such programs are undertaken.

Dec. 10—Three Selma, Alabama, businessmen are acquitted of the murder of the Reverend James Reeb of Boston last March, after Reeb had taken part in voting rights demonstrations.

Dec. 23—A federal court judge in Louisiana

issues a temporary restraining order against white landlords, stopping them from evicting Negro tenants who registered to vote.

Negro leaders in Natchez call off the December 3 agreement and threaten a mass march because of alleged police brutality.

Dec. 27—U.S. Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach issues regulations requiring proof of discrimination and efforts by federal officials to obtain voluntary compliance before federal funds can be withheld from local governments under the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

James Farmer resigns as the national director of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) to assume the presidency of a nationwide literacy and training program.

Dec. 30—In a letter to a Chicago school official, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare John W. Gardner reports that the federal government is sending investigators to look into charges of racial discrimination in Chicago's public schools.

Economy, The

(See also *U.S. Government.*)

Dec. 31—The Bethlehem Steel Company today raises the prices of its structural steel products \$5 a ton. Bethlehem Steel is the nation's second largest producer of steel. President Lyndon B. Johnson comments that “This is certainly no time for unwarranted price increases which can lead to inflation.”

Foreign Policy

Dec. 1—The U.S. begins its airlift of refugees from Cuba, with 75 exiles on the first flight. Under the agreement with the Cuban government, between 3,000 and 4,000 are expected to be flown monthly to the U.S.

The White House Conference on International Cooperation ends by submitting over 300 recommendations to the administration. The four-day meeting of 5,000 participants produces suggestions ranging from curbing increased population to internationalizing the potential wealth of the moon.

Dec. 4—The State Department reveals that

the U.S. and the Soviet Union have agreed to resume disarmament negotiations in Geneva in late January to try to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

Dec. 5—The government asks U.S. businessmen to reduce foreign investments by \$1 billion next year. For 1965 direct investment abroad is expected to reach an all-time high of \$3.4 billion.

Dec. 9—The President says he is determined that every prospect for peace in Vietnam be exhausted "before other hard steps are taken."

Dec. 10—The State Department reveals that the U.S.S.R. has given diplomatic assurances that it has no intention of placing nuclear weapons in orbit.

Dec. 15—Concluding two days of talks, the President and Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan report they agree on the need for a peaceful resolution of all outstanding Pakistani-Indian differences.

Dec. 17—The administration reveals receipt of an apparently guarded North Vietnam overture for peace talks. The "feeler" was relayed through Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani, the current U.N. General Assembly president. (See also *Italy*.)

British Prime Minister Wilson and President Johnson conclude two days of White House talks.

Dec. 18—The administration withholds comment on North Vietnam's denial that it is interested in peace talks.

Dec. 21—Ending two days of Washington talks, West German Chancellor Erhard and President Johnson agree to abandon for the present any plans for an allied nuclear force in which the Bonn government would have a part.

Dec. 22—India is assured by the U.S. of enough wheat to avert a possible severe famine. Wheat shipments could double in the next year under open-end assurances given to Indian officials.

Dec. 27—Vice-President Hubert Humphrey leaves for a week-long trip to the Far East.

Dec. 28—The U.S. prohibits the export of gasoline, kerosene and other petroleum products to Rhodesia.

Administration sources reveal that the

U.S. has let North Vietnam know that the current halt in air attacks is intended to provide Hanoi with an opportunity to show its interest in peace negotiations.

Dec. 29—As rumours persist that the U.S. is feeling out Hanoi's inclinations for peace, Ambassador-at-large Averell Harriman confers with top Polish leaders, U.N. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg confers with Pope Paul and Ambassador Foy Kohler confers with Soviet President Podgorny.

Travel restrictions are relaxed to permit doctors and medical scientists to visit Cuba, Communist China, Albania, North Korea and North Vietnam.

Dec. 30—With U.S. diplomats still conferring with various world leaders, Bill Moyers, presidential press secretary, confirms the fact that the U.S. is exploring the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam war. American air raids on North Vietnam are in suspension for the 7th day.

Government

Dec. 1—The new immigration law, abolishing national origin quotas, becomes effective.

Dec. 2—President Johnson tells the Business Council that he predicts another record year for the economy without any outbreak of inflation.

Dec. 5—The Federal Reserve Board announces an increase in the discount rate from 4 to 4.5 per cent. The board says the move is being taken "to reinforce efforts to maintain price stability." President Johnson declares he regrets the board's action, since it will "raise the cost of credit particularly for homes, schools, hospital and factories."

Dec. 6—The Federal Power Commission reports that the November 9 Northeast power failure would not have occurred had all the electric power systems involved been following more careful operating procedures.

Dec. 8—The resignation of McGeorge Bundy as special assistant to the President for national security affairs, effective February 28, is announced. Mr. Bundy is to become president of the Ford Foundation.

Dec. 15—The chairman of the Federal Power Commission, Joseph Swidler, asks Congress to give the commission the legal authority to set and enforce minimum safe-operating standards for the electric power industry.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration halts further work on the Advanced Orbiting Solar Observatory because of "budgetary considerations."

Dec. 18—The President appoints Harold Howe 2nd as U.S. commissioner of education.

Dec. 19—Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics seize \$18.5 million worth of heroin in the largest single such seizure ever made in the U.S.

Labor

Dec. 9—The sixth convention of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations opens in San Francisco. President Johnson sends a message appealing for organized labor's cooperation in preventing inflation.

Dec. 13—George Meany is reelected president of the A.F.L.-C.I.O.

Dec. 15—The A.F.L.-C.I.O. pledges its "unstinting support" of "all measures the Administration might deem necessary" in the Vietnam war.

Dec. 28—The government increases pressure for successful negotiations to end a month-long machinists' strike at the Olin Mathieson Chemical Company plant in Illinois which is virtually the sole producer of certain gunpowder used by U.S. forces in Vietnam.

Military

Dec. 3—Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara orders the development of a reconnaissance version of the F-111 movable-wing fighter plane. Official sources also report the imminent authorization for development of a speedy new Air Force bomber to replace the Strategic Air Command's B-52's.

Dec. 4—Gemini 7 begins its 14-day space voyage around the earth. Aboard are Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Frank Borman and Navy Commander James Lovell.

Dec. 6—Defense Secretary McNamara announces that 149 additional military bases, mainly in the U.S., will be closed, consolidated or reduced in size.

Dec. 8—The Pentagon announces a "realignment" of the strategic air forces, with two-thirds of the force of 600 B-52's and all of the 80 B-58 bombers in S.A.C. to be inactivated by 1971.

Dec. 15—Gemini 6 is fired into space with Captain Walter Shirra and Major Thomas Stafford as crew. The ship rendezvouses with Gemini 7 and the two spacecrafts fly a four-hour formation, at times only six to ten feet apart.

Dec. 18—After its record-breaking 14 days in space, Gemini 7 lands in the Atlantic Ocean. Gemini 6 had landed safely two days earlier.

Dec. 20—Secretary McNamara announces an indefinite postponement of \$620 million worth of military construction.

Dec. 21—Draft director Lieutenant General Lewis Hershey says Selective Service will induct registrants who burn draft cards or conduct sit-ins at local draft boards.

Dec. 23—A Selective Service spokesman says plans are being made to draw conscripts from the pool of about two million men classified as 1-Y. This is the classification for men failing to meet certain army physical or mental standards.

Dec. 27—Two U.S. soldiers freed last month by the Vietcong are charged with aiding the enemy during their two years of capture.

Dec. 30—The Department of Defense asks U.S. news media to "refrain voluntarily" from publishing information about the movement of troops to Vietnam.

URUGUAY

Dec. 6—The ruling National Council gives the government special powers to deport Communist labor leaders and to send arrested labor leaders to detention camps.

Dec. 9—A 24-hour general strike is called throughout the country. The government arrests 347 employees of the Bank of the Republic.

VATICAN, THE

(See also *Greece*.)

Dec. 6—Pope Paul VI ends the power of the Holy Office to take secret, arbitrary disciplinary action against persons accused of heresy.

Dec. 7—The Pope and Patriarch Athenagoras I publicly deplore and consign to oblivion the anathema of 1054 which, with its excommunications, began the centuries-old schism between the Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox churches.

The Ecumenical Council approves the 35,000-word pastoral constitution, "The Church in the Modern World." The document condemns war and the nuclear arms race, insists the church is interested in material as well as spiritual welfare and exalts the value of conjugal love and family well-being to a position of equality with the procreation of children.

Dec. 8—The Ecumenical Council closes.

Dec. 24—Pope Paul appeals directly to the leaders of North and South Vietnam to extend the Christmas truce into a "just and brotherly peace."

VIETNAM, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

Dec. 18—North Vietnam labels as "sheer, groundless fabrications" reports that it has sent peace feelers to the U.S. through the U.N. by way of two Italian professors who talked with President Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi in November.

Dec. 31—In a New Year's message President Ho Chi Minh repeats North Vietnam's peace terms, and thanks the American people for opposing U.S. military policies in Vietnam.

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

Dec. 2—The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier *Enterprise* becomes the first such ship to enter combat as she launches her first air strikes over Vietnam.

Dec. 5—A guerrilla force inflicts "moderate" casualties on a U.S. infantry battalion in hand-to-hand fighting at an abandoned rubber plantation north of Saigon.

Dec. 7—The Vietcong radio proposes a 12-hour Christmas cease-fighting truce.

Dec. 9—North Vietnam is subjected to the most intensive bombardment of the war in an apparent drive to reduce infiltration of North Vietnamese troops into the South.

Dec. 15—In the first major U.S. air blow against a North Vietnamese major industrial target, bombers smash a power plant 14 miles from Haiphong, North Vietnam's major port.

Dec. 20—Reports from Saigon indicate that U.S. planes have been spraying chemicals to destroy the rice crop in some areas under Vietcong control.

Dec. 23—U.S. and South Vietnam military commanders announce they have ordered a 30-hour Christmas truce, with troops ordered to fire only if fired upon.

Dec. 27—Following the Christmas truce, which was apparently violated in many instances by the Vietcong, ground fighting resumes but air attacks continue to be suspended.

Dec. 28—The Vietcong proposes to South Vietnam a 4-day cease-fire during the Vietnamese New Year observances from January 20 to 23.

ZAMBIA

Dec. 2—The first of a group of R.A.F. planes lands in Zambia from Britain.

Dec. 19—A four-man team, headed by Foreign Minister Simon M. Kapwepwe, leaves for London talks with Prime Minister Wilson. After these talks the team will split up, with half going to the U.S. and half to Moscow in an effort to persuade Britain, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to back a U.N. resolution calling for force to overthrow the Rhodesian government. (See also *The U.S.S.R.*)

Dec. 23—Foreign Minister Kapwepwe confers in Washington with U.S. officials on increased economic aid to offset the breakdown in normal trade between Zambia and Rhodesia.

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